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ABSTRACT 
The Narrative End Item Report contained herein is a narrative summary 
of the Douglas manufacturing and test records relative to the Saturn
 
S-IVB-AS208 Flight Stage (Douglas P/N 1A74633-513, S/N 2008). 
Narrations are included on those conditions related to permanent 
nonconformances which were generated during the manufacturing cycle 
and existed at the time of acceptance testing. The report sets forth 
data pertinent to total time or cycle accumulation on time or cycle 
significant items. Data relative to variations in flight critical 
components is included. There.is no provision to update or revise the
 
NEIR after initial release. 
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PREFACE 
This Narrative End Item Report is prepared by the Reliability Assurance 
Operations Department of McDonnell Douglas Corporation for the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration under contract NAS 7-101. 
This report is presented in response to requirements of NPC 200-2, 
paragraph 14.2.4, and is issued in accordance with Douglas Report 
SM-41410, Data Submittal Document, Saturn S-IVB System, which details 
contract data required from the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The 
report summarizes the period from initial stage acceptance testing at 
the Douglas Space Systems Center, Huntington Beach, California, through 
final acceptance testing at the Douglas Sacramento Test Center (STC),
 
Sacramento, California, and turnover to NASA/MSFC for delivery to
 
NASA/FTC.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Scope 
The NEIR compiles quality evidence and assessments of a particular end item 
for use in evaluating program objectives and end item usage. This report
 
narrates upon the Saturn S-IVB-208 and discusses the following:
 
a. 	Final configuration.
 
b. 	 Replacements made during test and final checkout (including 
serial number and change letter of articles removed or 
substituted).
 
c. 	 Nature of problems and malfunctions encountered. 
d. 	Corrective action taken or pending.
 
e. 	Extent of retests or tests not completed.
 
f. 	Total operating hours or cycles for each time or cycle significant
 
system or subsystem.
 
1.2 Format
 
This document is organized into sections, with each section fulfilling a
 
specific purpose. The title of each section, and a brief outline of its 
purpose follow.
 
SECTION:
 
1. 	INTRODUCTION. This section discusses the scope of the NEIR, the 
Stage Design Concept, Documentation, and Turnover Data. 
2. 	 SYSTEM TEST SUMMARIES. A brief summary of principal test 
areas is presented to give management personnel a concise view 
of successful test achievement, and remaining areas of concern. 
3. 	 STAGE CONFIGURATION. Conformance to Engineering design. 
4. 	NARRATIVES. A presentation of checkout operations, presented
 
with the checkouts at Sacramento Test Center (STC), followed 
by Space System Center (SSC) checkouts. Failure and Rejection
 
Reports (FARR's) are referenced, as applicable for each paragraph. 
5. 	 POSTRETENTION. A presentation of stage configuration, additional 
stage testing prior to shipment (if any), final inspection, 
weight and balance, preshipment purge, retest requirements, post­
checkout FARt's, and flight critical items installed at shipment. 
1.2 (Continued)
 
APPENDICES:
 
1. 	 CHARTS. Weld defect charts, which show weld discrepancies 
included in Table II Failure and Rejection Reports. 
2. 	 TABLES. 
a. TABLE I. A compilation of FARR's recorded during systems 
installation and checkout.
 
b. 	TABLE II. A compilation of FARR's against structural
 
assemblies.
 
3. GLOSSARY. A list of terms, abbreviations, and phrases used
 
in the NEIR text, with a brief definition of each. 
1.3 Stage Functional Description
 
A detailed systems analysis is beyond the scope of this report. The
 
"S-IVB-208 Stage End Iten Test Plan", 1B66532, contains a description of
 
each operational system, and includes a listing of test procedures, with 
the 	objective and prerequisite of each test. Stage 208 is primarily a
 
booster stage, consisting of propellant tanks, feed lines, electrical
 
and pneumatic power for operation of stage systems, and such systems as
 
are 	required for checkout purposes, fuel loading and unloading control,
 
in-flight control and pressurization, and data measurement during these 
operations.
 
1.4 Documentation
 
Manufacturing and test records for this stage include Fabrication Orders
 
(FO's), Assembly Outlines (AO's), Failure and Rejection Reports (FARR's),
 
Serial Engineering Orders (sEe's), Radiographic Inspection Records, 
Hydrostatic test data, Vehicle Checkout Laboratory (VCL) test data, STC
 
test data, and vendor data. FO's and AO's record in sequence all manu­
facturing processes, procedures, and Quality Control inspection activities. 
Any discrepancy from a drawing requirement is recorded on a FARR by 
Inspection and Test personnel. The FARR is also used to record the 
Material Review Board (MRB) disposition applicable to the discrepancy. 
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1.4 (Continued) 
SEO's may be written to define the rework required by a FARR; to change the 
effectivity of a drawing; or to change other drawing requirements. Radio­
graphic Inspection Records and X-ray photographs of all weld seams are main­
tained on file by the contractor. All original data is retained in the con­
tractor's Reliability Assurance Department Central Data files. Vendor 
technical data is received on functional purchased parts and also retained in 
Central Data files. The majority of documentation referenced within this 
report is included in the log book which accompanies the stage.
 
1.5 Turnover Data
 
1.5.1 Douglas Space Systems Center 
Transfer of the Saturn DSV-4B-2-1 (S-IVB-208) Stage, for transport to Douglas 
STC, was made on 1 December 1966, at Douglas SSC, Huntington Beach. A letter, 
A3-131-12.30.8-L-2997, dated 1 December 1966, from the Douglas Contracts
 
Manager to the NASA/MSFC Resident Management Office, I-CO-SD/DAC, covered
 
the submittal of documentation for purposes of technical transfer of the
 
stage to STC. A copy of that letter and accompanying documentation was 
included in the Stage Log Book. Stage shipment was accomplished by packing 
sheet SM48923-6, dated 1 December 1966. 
1.5.2 Sacramento Test Center
 
The turnover of Stage 208 for retention at the Sacramento Test Center was 
accomplished on 22 March 1967. On 24 March 1967, the stage was placed in 
storage per Contract Change Order 1181. Section 5 of this report, covering 
stage activities during and following the stage storage period, includes the 
final stage turnover and shipment data. 
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2.0 SYSTEM TEST SUMMARIES 
The following paragraphs present a narrative sunmmary of the system checkouts of 
Stage 208. System checkouts conducted at the Sacramento Test Center (STC) and 
the Space Systems Center (SSC) are summarized in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 res­
pectively. Detailed narrations of the stage checkouts at STC and SSC, and of 
stage manufacturing tests at SSC, are presented in Section 4. 
2.1 -tag& Checkout. STC
 
The stage acceptance test program, conducted at the Sacramento Test Center
 
between December 1966 and March 1967, verified the ability of the stage
 
systems to function during a full duration static acceptance firing at sea 
level conditions. The S-IVB-208 Acceptance Firing Test Plan, SM-47458, 
delineated the general philosophies of the STC Test Program, and Test Request 
1045, S-IVB-208 Stage Acceptance Firing, depicted the test requirements and 
authorized the acceptance firing. Stage preparations included the prefiring 
checkouts, an integrated systems test, and a simulated static firing. 
2.1.1 Prefiring Activity 
The stage arrived at STC on 2- December 1966, and was installed in the Beta 
Complex test stand I. For documentary presentation, the prefire checkouts 
were categorized as follows: 
a. Test preparation. 
b. Propulsion system tests.
 
c. Electrical/electronic systems tests.
 
d. Structural inspection.
 
e. Common bulkhead vacuum system test. 
f. Environmental control systems tests. 
g. Hydraulic system tests. 
h. Integrated systems test. 
i. Countdown operations. 
The test preparations procedures covered the installation of the test equip­
ment required to conduct and monitor stage system checkouts. 
The propulsion system tests included a manual stage and GSE controls check, 
an automatic system checkout, and the preliminary and final leak checks. 
The electrical/electronic systems tests consisted of ten procedures grouped
 
as follows: 
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2.1.1 (Continued)
 
a. Power distribution tests. 
b. Umbilical interface compatibility test. 
c. Digital data acquisition system test. 
d. Signal conditioning setup. 
e. Propellant utilization tests,. 
f. Level sensor and control unit calibration. 
g. Cryogenic temperature sensor verification. 
The structural inspection checkout provided the required check points to
 
verify the structural integrity of the stage. 
The conmmon bulkhead vacuum system checkout verified the integrity of the
 
conon bulkhead and the adjoining LOX and 1H 2 tanks. 
The environmental control systems tests checked out the temperature condi­
tioning in the forward skirt, aft skirt, and interstage areas, and provided 
purging of these locations. 
The hydraulic system setup and operation procedure, and automatic checkout 
procedure, verified the integrity, cleanliness, and operation of the system. 
The integrated systems checkout verified that the stage and all associated 
ground support equipment were ready for propellant loading and static
 
firing. 
The countdown procedure controlled all tasks required for propellant loading, 
static acceptance firing, residual propellant off-loading, and stage securing. 
2.1.2 Acceptance Firing 
Countdown number 614076 was initiated on ll January 1967, proceeded without 
incident through engine start on 12 January 1967, and achieved 427 seconds 
of mainstage operation. Mainstage firing was terminated by a programmed 
computer controlled cutoff, and stage securing operations proceeded normally.
 
2.1.3 Postfiring Activity 
The postfiring systems checkouts, designed to verify that static acceptance 
firing had not adversely affected system performance, were initiated in the 
Beta I test stand and completed in the vehicle checkout laboratory (VCL). 
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2.1.3 (Continued)
 
For presentation, these checkouts are grouped as follows:
 
a. Propulsion system tests (test stand and VCL). 
b. Electrical/electronic systems tests (test stand and VCL)­
c. Hydraulic system tests (test stand and VCL). 
d. Environmental control systems tests (test stand and VCL).
 
e. All systems test (VCL). 
The propulsion system tests included test equipment removal, a manual
 
controls check, system leak checks, and checks of the auxiliary propulsion
 
system. 
The electrical/electronic systems tests included checks of the stage power
 
setup and turnoff; the power distribution system; the APS interface compati­
bility; the digital data acquisition, range safety, and propellant utilization
 
systems; and the exploding bridgewire system. 
The hydraulic system tests covered the postfiring operation and securing of 
the system. 
The environmental control systems tests controlled the operation and checkout 
of the forward skirt thermoconditioning system and the aft skirt and inter­
stage thermoconditioning and purge system. 
The all systems test accomplished the final verification that the various 
stage systems would function collectively in a simulated flight situation. 
2.2 Stage Checkout, SSC
 
The stage was placed in SSC VCL checkout tower 5 on 10 August 1966, and 
prepared for system tests. Checkout operations started on 18 August 1966 and
 
terminated on 12 October 1966, after 39 days of activity. Detailed narration 
on all tests will be found in paragraph 4.2, with the following six major
 
areas of testing covered:
 
a. Umbilical mechanical mating. 
b. Environmental control systems. 
c. Electrical/electronic systems. 
d. Propulsion system.
 
e. Hydraulic system.
 
f. All systems test. 
As certain portions of the testing program were performed simultaneously, the
 
grouping is arbitrary in order to form a coherent sequence. 
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2.2 (Continued)
 
The-umbilical mating tests, consisting of two procedures, verified the
 
umbilical fit and function. No malfunctions were encountered.
 
The environmental control system tests of the forward skirt thermocondition­
ing system, consisting of three procedures, were satisfactorily completed. 
The check of the aft skirt and interstage thermoconditioning and purge system
 
was also accomplished without significant problems.
 
The electrical/electronic systems tests consisted of eighteen procedures,
 
divided into the following eleven areas:
 
a. Power distribution tests.
 
b. Continuity compatibility checks.
 
c. Propellant utilization tests.
 
d. Level sensor and control unit calibration. 
e. Exploding bridgewire test.
 
f. Range safety tests.
 
g. Cryogenic temperature sensor verification.
 
h. Signal conditioning setup. 
i. Digital data acquisition tests.
 
j. Telemetry and range safety antenna system test. 
k. APS simulator test. 
Revisions were made to the procedures as required to implement corrections
 
and changes, and to allow testing with existing equipment shortages. 
Difficulties and problems were suitably resolved, including six items that 
were covered by FARR's. 
The propulsion system tests consisted of the following categories:
 
a. Propulsion system control console/stage compatibility test.
 
b. LH2 tank pressurization system leak check. 
c. Pneumatic control system leak check.
 
d. Cold helium system leak check. 
e. Propellant tanks leak check. 
f. J-2 engine leak check. 
g. Engine alignment. 
h. Propulsion system automatic test. 
All of the propulsion system tests were completed satisfactorily, with 
revisions as required. Leakage and other problems were suitably resolved, 
including two FARR items. 
2.2 (Continued) 
The hydraulic system tests, consisting of two procedures, were satisfactorily 
completed after some procedure and program changes. No FARR's were generated. 
The all systems automatic test, performed with umbilicals in and with 
umbilicals out, was completed satisfactorily, with forty-eight procedural 
revisions. No failures were reported. 
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3.0 STAGE CONFIGURATION
 
Paragraph 3.1 discusses the means used to verify the stage configuration,
 
while paragraph 3.2 presents those scope changes and engineering change
 
proposals affecting the stage. Components and assemblies which are vari­
ations to the stage design are presented in Section 5.
 
3.1 Design Intent Verification
 
The configuration of this stage is defined in the Engineering Configuration 
List (ECL) for Space Vehicle, Model DSV-4B-2-1, Manufacturing Serial Number 
2008, MSFC identification number S-IVB-SA2OS, revision A, dated 21 November 
1966. This ECL document includes a listing of all parts, nonhardware draw­
ings, and manufacturing and process specifications required for manufacture 
and testing of the stage, as defined by Engineering production drawings and 
EQ releases. The ECL has been transmitted to NASA under separate cover.
 
Verification of design intent was accomplished by comparing the ECL, the
 
Planning Configuration List (PCL), and the Reliability Assurance Department
 
As-Built Configuration List (ABCL). Any noted discrepancies were resolved
 
by the contractor, and a listing of the resultant action is filed at the
 
contractor's facility.
 
3.2 Scope Changes and Engineering Change Proposals
 
SC/ECP's that affect Stage 208 are listed as follows: Paragraph 3.2.1 lists
 
those SC/ECP's that were incorporated in the initial design. Paragraph 3.2.2
 
lists those SC/ECP's that were incorporated during manufacturing and VCL
 
checkout. Those SC/ECP's that are not fully incorporated and verified at
 
stage turnover to FTC are presented in Section 5.
 
3.2.1 SC/ECPIs Incorporated in Initial Design
 
The following SC/ECP's were part of the original engineering release and 
were therefore incorporated in the initial design:
 
3.2.1 (Continued) 
SO 1016B SC 1185 SC 1354 
SC 1027B Sc 195A SC 1363 
Sc 1075B SC 1196 SC 1364 
SC 1096 SC 1230 SC 1390 
SC 1104A SC 1232A Sc 1397 
Sc 1115 SC 1266 ECP X005 
Sc 1151 SC 1278A ECP X043 
SC 1152 SC 1282 ECP X095 
SC 1167 Sc 1295 
SC 1176 SC 1306 
3.2.2 SC/ECE's Incorporated During Manufacturing and VOL Checkout 
The following SC/ECP's have been incorporated during manufacturing and
 
recorded on the DD829-1 form in the Stage Log Book:
 
SC 1045B SC 1274 ECP X176 
SC 1124 SC 1280 ECP X178 
SC 1153A SO 1297A ECP X180 
SC 1187 SC 1326 ECP Y190 
SC 1189 ECP X021 ECP X239 
SC 1193 ECP X056 ECP X255 
SC 1203 ECP X099 ECP 0271 
SC 1205 ECP X114 ECP 0278 
SC 1207 ECP X124 ECP 0314 
SC 1218 ECP X136 ECP 0354 
SC 1241 ECP X137 
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4.0 NARRATIVE - STAGE CHECKOUT
 
A narration of each test procedure required for stage systems checkout is
 
presented in this paragraph. The-major subparagraphs comprising the
 
narrative are:
 
a. Stage Checkout - STC
 
b. Stage Checkout - SS
 
c. Stage Manufacturing Tests
 
Each of these major subparagraphs is further subdivided to the degree required
 
to present a complete historical record of stage checkout.
 
Permanent nonconformances and functional failures affecting the stage have
 
been recorded on FARR's, which are referenced by serial numbers throughout
 
this paragraph (e.g. FARR A229810). Those FARR's referenced in paragraph 4.1
 
are presented in numerical (serial number) order, in section 1 of table I; and
 
those referred to in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 are similarly presented in sections
 
2 and 3 of table I, and section 1 of table II.
 
4.1 Stage Checkout - STC
 
Checkout of the stage at STC began in December 1966, and was successfully
 
completed by March 1967. The handling and checkout precedures were performed
 
to meet the objectives outlined in test request 1045, Stage Acceptance Firing.
 
One countdown attempt was required to attain a successful acceptance firing
 
of the stage. The prefiring and postfiring "as run" procedures reviewed
 
under this paragraph were included as part of the Stage Log Book.
 
4.1.1 Test Preparation
 
The preparation of the stage for prefiring checkouts in the Beta I test stand
 
was accomplished using two procedures. These were the propulsion system
 
installation test preparation, and the electrical preparation document.
 
4.1.1.1. Propulsion Systems Installation Test Preparation (1B70451 A)
 
This manual checkout, initiated on 9 December 1966 and accepted on 4 January
 
1967, verified the configuration and performance of the propulsion system
 
test installations required for static firing. The test sequence was:
 
a. Helium purges
 
b. Ground line connections to stage tanks.
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4.1..1. (Continued)
 
c. Vehicle monitor panel and hardwire transducer connections.
 
d. Auxiliary pressurization system connections. 
e. Prevalves ground control, ground connection to prevalves. 
f. LH2 prevalve shaft seal drain line.
 
g. Diffuser installation. 
h. Hardwire transducer connections for tanks. 
i. Ground support equipment pressure switch checks. 
Eleven revisions were made to the procedure. One specified reinstallation of 
the non-propulsive vents; one provided for obtaining moisture samples; four 
revisions made required plumbing changes; one authorized a hookup to monitor 
the LOX tank pressure; one added connections erroneously left out of the pro­
cedure; two revisions deleted steps that were no longer necessary; and one 
updated the procedure to the latest EO change. 
4.1.1.2. Electrical Preparation Document (1B71089 A)
 
The purpose of this procedure was to accumulate all electrical prefiring
 
test-oriented jobs into a single document.
 
The jobs were conducted between 7 December 1966 and 10 January 1967. Two
 
revisions were written. One deleted steps not required for this stage check­
out, and the other revision changed cable callouts to make them agree with 
drawing 1A83832. There were no discrepancies recorded. 
4.1.2 Propulsion System Tests, Prefiring 
The automatic and manual checkouts of the function and integrity of the stage
 
propulsion system, in preparation for static acceptance firing, consisted of 
the following four procedures: 
a. Stage and GSE manual controls check. 
b. Propulsion system test (automatic functional checkout). 
c. Propulsion system leak check.
 
d. Final propulsion system leak check. 
4.1.2.1. Stage and GSE Manual Controls Check. (1B70177 C)
 
The manual mode of the components in the stage and GSE propulsion system
 
controls was verified by this procedure. Between 12 and 1L December 1966,
 
the pneumatic regulators in consoles A and B, and the stage, as well as the
 
separate solenoid and pneumatic valves in consoles A and B, the LH2 and LOX 
control skids, and in the stage, were manually functioned. 
14 
4.1.2.1 (Continued)
 
Two revisions were incorporated in the test. One deleted steps not required
 
for this stage, and the second provided for and authorized the checkout of
 
the trickle purge system.
 
4.1.2.2 Propulsion System Test (IB62762 D)
 
Performed on 21 December 1966 and accepted for filing on 7 January 1967, this 
automatic test verified the integrated electrical/mechanical function of the 
stage propulsion system preparatory to static acceptance firing. The auto­
matically programmed sequence of events included:
 
a. Pressure switches test. 
b. Pneumatic control system test. 
c. LHI- and LOX tank pressurization system test. 
d. J- engine system test.
 
Twenty-eight revisions were written to this procedure. Eleven corrected pro­
gram errors; six changed program parameters; eight accepted minor discrepancies 
or test condition changes; two deleted steps not required; and one corrected 
typing of the malfunctions. 
4.1.2.3 Propulsion System Leak Check (1B70176 C) 
This manual procedure was conducted to verify that the stage propulsion system
 
was free of detrimental leakage conditions prior to static firing. Conducted 
between 8 December 1966 and 4 January 1967, the test included the following 
steps: 
a. Equipment setup.
 
b. Relief valve functional checks. 
c. Pressure switch checks.
 
d. Stage proof checks and pneumatic system leak and functional tests. 
e. Turbopump torque checks.
 
f. Engine checks. 
g. Fuel and oxidizer tank checks.
 
Twenty-two leakage conditions were described on the leak check log. Nineteen
 
were corrected by replacing seals and/or retonquing loose connections; one
 
was found to be a duplicate entry in the leak check log; and two were accept­
able to Engineering for use.
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4.1.2.3. (Continued) 
Forty-three revisions were made to this checkout as follows: 
a. 	Seven revisions modified the system in support of the automatic
 
propulsion tests. 
b. 	Four deleted steps which were no longer required.
 
c. 	Nine revisions revised or deleted other revisions.
 
d. 	Two revisions removed orifices in support of other portions
 
of the test.
 
e. 	 Two revisions provided a method for pressurizing or isolating the 
thrust chamber as required for certain parts of the tests. 
f. 	 One revision provided for maintaining a constant ullage pressure. 
g. 	 One revision authorized leak check of the fuel pressure module 
check valve reverse flow and redundant check valve reverse flow. 
h. 	 One revision provided the hookup required to check oat the engine 
purge system. 
i. 	Another revision authorized the use of a trickle purge required
 
while the LH2 chilldown pump was being replaced. j. 	 A revision provided a procedure for finding the pneumatic decay 
rate of the system. 
k. 	 One revision provided a procedure for making engine pneumatic 
control leak checks. 
1. 	 One revision increased the leakage tolerance for the LH2 vent 
and relief valve to allow its use during static firing. 
m. 	One revision determined the supply pressure required to achieve
 
450 	psig at the LOX dome purge diffuser. 
n. 	 Another revision removed a test plate from the pipe assembly 
purge valve inlet and torqued the bolts, thus completing the 
engine pneumatic package.
 
o. 	 One revision provided a more positive way to check the pipe 
assembly purge valve seat. 
p. 	 One revision provided the start bottle decay test. 
q. 	 One revision made the changes required for SIN static firing. 
r. 	 A revision authorized the steps needed to maintain the vehicle 
purge system. 
s. 	 Two revisions provided for console B integrity tests. 
t. 	One revision specified checkouts of hardwire transducers not
 
normally checked when the system was pressurized. 
u. One revision provided for a 0-60 gauge to be used instead of a 
0-100 gauge since the latter was not available. 
v. 	One revision allowed greater GN2 flow in the system. 
w. 	 One revision changed the misleading nomenclature on a test plate. 
4.1.2.4 Final Propulsion System Leak Check (IB70175 C) 
This manual leak check procedure, conducted and accepted by Engineering 
between 7 and 9 January 1967, verified the function of the stage propulsion 
system just prior to static acceptance firing. The tests conducted included: 
4.1.2.4 (Continued)
 
a. Console valve integrity check.
 
b. Stage pneumatic system leak check (helium).
 
c. Cold helium system leak check (helium).
 
d. LOX and LH2 tankage leak checks (helium). 
e. Engine thrust chamber leak check. 
f. Engine start bottle leak check. 
g. Engine pneumatic leak and functional check.
 
h. Removal of crossovers.
 
i. System purges. 
Three leakage conditions were noted on the leak check log. Two were corrected 
by replacing seals, and one was resolved by retorquing a fitting. 
Twenty revisions were recorded in the log sheet. Nine deleted steps not
 
required for this checkout, six revisions provided methods'or procedures 
required for the testing of the engine control and engine start bottles; one 
increased the cold helium lockup time; one revision connected a test gauge to 
monitor thrust chamber pressure; one provided for the removal of the test
 
plates; one revision decreased the pressure of the first stage GN2; and one 
changed the designation of the cold helium solenoid connector L3903W2 from 
P49 to P23. There were no malfunctions recorded to this procedure.
 
4.1.3 Electrical/Electronic Systems Tests, Prefiring 
The narrative presentation on the checkout of the stage electrical/electronic
 
systems is subdivided for presentation as follows:
 
a. Power distribution tests
 
b. Umbilical interface compatibility check
 
c. Digital data acquisition system checkout
 
d. Signal conditioning setup
 
e. Propellant utilization system tests 
f. Level sensor and control unit calibration
 
g. Cryogenic temperature sensor verification
 
4.l.3 .1. Power Distribution System Tests, Prefiring
 
Three test procedures were performed to ensure the proper function of the
 
power distribution system components, as well as the ability of the ACS
 
to remotely activate, control, and deactivate stage power. These included
 
the stage power setup, power distribution system, and stage power turnoff.
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4.1.3.1.1 Stage Power Setup (1B59496 C)
 
Performed on 10 December 1966, and certified for filing on 13 December 1966,
 
this automatic checkout contained the steps which verified the operational
 
capability of the ACS to control and activate the stage electrical power dis­
tribution system prior to automatic systems. checkout. These procedures also 
ensured that the stage forward and aft power distribution systems were not 
subjected to excessive static loads during initial setup sequences. 
One revision was written to delete unnecessary steps. There were no 
functional failures. 
4.1.3.1.2 Power Distribution System (1135949a C) 
Due to faulty shorting out modules, this automatic test had to be rerun in 
order to reverify the power distribution system. The first run was conducted 
on 16 December, and the second on 27 December 1966. The various tests per­
formed established that static loads were not excessive. At the same time, 
the operational capability of the automatic checkout system (ACS) to control 
power switching to and within the stage was verified. 
Eleven revisions were written to this automatic test of which five were made 
during run one, and six were written during the second run. Revisions to the 
first run include: Two revisions deleting steps not required; one rerunning 
the first portion of the procedure due to a malfunction in the PCM RF assembly 
current calculation routine; one verifying the new EDS system wiring; and 
one manually measuring chilldown inverter voltages. The six revisions to 
the second run included one authorizing the rerunning of the test; two 
deleting and modifying steps as required; one verifying the operation of the 
No. 4 LOX and LH2 level sensors; one deleting erroneous results caused by 
improper setups; and one verifying the new EDS wiring. 
A second issue of this procedure was made necessary due to the 
large amount of rework performed on components tested. Issue two was con­
ducted on 9 January, and certified for filing on fl January 1967. 
Five revisions were made to this issue, as follows: 
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a. 	One provided a process for verifying the new EDS wiring.
 
b. 	Two revisions deleted statements no longer required.
 
c. 	One provided a method for verifying the operation of the LOX
 
and LH2 No. 4 level sensors.
 
d. 	 One revision explained that chilldown inverter data collected
 
on run, issue one was acceptable.
 
4.1.3.1.3 Stage Power Turnoff (1B59497 C) 
This automatic checkout contained the automatic ahd manual procedures used 
to shut down the stage power distribution system after the completion of 
various stage checkout procedures. Also verified was the capability of the 
GSE to control power switching to and within the stage. 
The tests were successfully conducted on 10 December and certified for filing
 
on 15 December 1966. There were .no revisions or other discrepancies recorded
 
against these procedures.
 
4.1.3.2 Umbilical Interface Compatibility Test (1B64306 C) 
Provided in this document was the procedure to check the integrity of the 
stage umbilical wiring, and to assure that proper loads were present on all 
power busses, and that the control circuits for propulsion valves and 
safety items on the stage were within prescribed tolerances. 
Five revisions were written to this procedure. Two accepted out-of-tolerance 
readings; one deleted steps not required; one changed tolerance values; and
 
one called out remeasuring a parameter after the installation of module 
403A73A1. 
4.1.3.3 Digital Data Acquisition System (IB59500 C) 
The 	automatic digital data acquisition test, performed on 27 December 1966
 
and accepted on 3 January 1967, provided the operational status verification 
of all data channels on the stage. Channels equipped with signal insertion 
capability were compared to tolerance limits with a high and/or low mode 
calibration command programed through the remote automatic checkout system 
(RACS). Channels without RACS capability were tested-by comparing the end 
item outputs under ambient conditions to their tolerance limits. This test 
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included the proper operation of all signal conditioning units, associated
 
amplifiers, command calibration channel decoders, multiplexers, digital 
data acquisition assembly and central command calibration decoder assembly. 
Fifteen revisions were written. Three corrected program errors; three
 
rejected and made provisions for replacement and test of faulty equipment,
 
(reference FARR's A219063, A219071, A229702, A229706); and nine revisions
 
retested and found acceptable equipment that had malfunctioned due to im­
proper test conditions, improper hookups, unusual ambient conditions (ambient
 
temperature was 360F), or test equipment malfunction.
 
The second issue of this automatic test was conducted on 9 January 1967 and 
accepted for filing on 10 January 1967. This procedure verified the opera­
tional status of all data channels on the stage. 
Fourteen revisions were made to this test as follows: Three corrected pro­
gram errors; nine explained apparent malfunctions and showed that the para­
meters were actually within tolerance; and two revisions provided for the 
rejection and replacement of a transducer and a DC amplifier which will be 
replaced and reverified during postfire runs (Reference FARR's A229706 and 
A229707). 
4.1.3.4 Signal Conditioning Setup (1B63149 B) 
This manual checkout calibrated the signal conditioning equipment when it
 
was found to be out of tolerance during automatic checks, or when a replaced 
component was found to be out of tolerance. In addition, it was used to 
verify the calibration of the 5 and 20 volt excitation modules. 
The checkout was conducted successfully between 22 December 1966 and 5 
January 1967. Two revisions were recorded. One changed the tolerance
 
on measurement M25-404, and the other revision deleted sections not required 
at this time. 
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4.1.3.5 Propellant Utilization System Tests 
The prefiring checkout of the propellant utilization system consisted of a
 
manual calibration procedure and an automatic checkout.
 
4.1.3.5.1 Propellant Utilization System Manual Calibration (1863373 B)
 
This checkout was initiated on 15 December 1966, and was accepted by Engineering
 
on 10 January 1967. As verification of the manual calibration of the propellant
 
utilization system, the sequence of tests included:
 
a. Verification of static inverter/converter output voltages.
 
b. LH2 and LOX bridge checks.
 
1. Empty and full calibration.
 
2. Data acquisition - position. 
3. Slew checks - 1/3 and 2/3 slew.
 
4. Linearity checks. 
c. Ratiometer calibration. 
d. Hardwire loading circuits.
 
One revision was written to explain that the helium purity in the stage tanks 
was maintained at a 99 per cent level by keeping the tanks under positive 
pressure at all times 
4.1.3.5.2 Propellant Utilization System (1B59504 C) 
This automatic checkout was conducted on 19 December 1966, and was certified
 
for filing on 10 January 1967, after ensuring that the propellant utilization
 
system was able to control the propellant flow mixture ratio in such manner as 
to achieve simultaneous propellant depletion. Four revisions were made to the 
checkout as follows: One corrected program errors; one entered the PU constants 
via paper tape; one revision added a slew of the PU valve in the opposite direc­
tion from that obtained with the LOX 1/3 checkout commands (Reference NASA letter 
I-I/B-SIVBS-VCL-L216); and the last revision provided for the obtaining of the 
postfire reverse slew data since the prefire data was inadvertently lost.
 
4.1.3.6 Level Sensor and Control Unit Calibration (1B63148 B) 
The purpose of this manual checkout was to adjust the operating point of the 
point level sensor control units to an operating level well within the limits of 
the capacitance change created in these units by a simulated wet condition RACS 
comnand. 
The test was conducted between 14 and 30 December 1966.
 
Four revisions were written as follows:
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a. Two calibrated the LOX and Fuel level sensor control units.
 
b. The third revision repeated steps which were not completed until 
a missing jumper wire was replaced. 
c. A revision deleted steps not required at this time. 
There were no discrepancies recorded against this checkout.
 
4.1.3.7 Cryogenic Temperature Sensor Verification (1B63146 A) 
The manual checkout established in this procedure, conducted on 9 December 
1966, verified the operational capability of each temperature sensor for 
which the normal operating range did not include ambient temperature. 
One revision was made to allow the measuring of C040, temperature, oxidizer 
tank position 1. 
There were no malfunctions recorded. 
4.1.4 Prefire Structural Inspection (1B40645 A) 
Initiated on 5 December 1966 and accepted by Engineering on 9 January 1967, 
this structural inspection verified that transportation and handling had no 
detrimental effect on the stage structure and established the prefire con­
dition of the stage for comparison with the postfire condition.
 
The prefire inspection included a visual receiving inspection of electrical, 
propulsion, and structural components per quality engineering charts 339,
 
329, 330, 340, 341, 342 and 344, and a radiographic inspection of the 
"V-section". 
Two revisions were written deleting the requirements of the APS fit check
 
and the visual inspection of the LH2 and LOX tank interior and installations, 
because this was to be performed during postfire structural inspection.
 
4.1.5 Common Bulkhead Vacuum System (IB49286 F) 
This manual checkout was started on 10 December 1966 and was successfully com­
pleted on 9 January 1967, verifying that the common bulkhead system was 
functionally capable of providing an evacuated thermal insulator between 
the fuel and oxidizer tanks prior to static firing. The checkout included 
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the following activities:
 
a. Test stand vacuum system setup and checkout.
 
b. Connon bulkhead checks.
 
1. Pumpdown, 96 hour.
 
2. Decay check.
 
3. Argon purge.
 
4. Leak check - tanks pressurized. 
Two revisions were written to this procedure. One provided for conducting 
a full 12 hour leak check which was not previously accomplished, and the 
second revision provided for the initiation of the bulkhead pumpdown after 
the 12 hour leak check.
 
4.1.6 Environmental Control System Tests, Prefiring
 
Two test procedures were conducted to ensure that the environmental control 
system components and linkages were both structurally sound and functional. 
They were:
 
a. Forward skirt thermoconditioning system checkout.
 
b. Forward and aft skirt purge systems. 
4.1.6.1 Forward Skirt Thermoconditioning System Operation (1B41955 A) 
Provided in this procedure was the equipment setup required to connect the 
thermoconditioning system servicer, P/N lB78829-1, to the forward skirt 
thermoconditioning system. The procedure also contained a TCS leak test, 
remote operation test, water/methanol cleanliness test, water/methanol specific
 
gravity test, TCS differential pressure test, and operational test.
 
Conducted between 7 and 29 December 1966, this checkout was accomplished
 
without revisions.
 
4.1.6.2 Environmental Control System, Forward and Aft Skirt Purge (1843749 A)
 
This manual checkout, conducted between 27 and 30 December 1966, verified
 
the environmental control system installation, P/N 1A77551-1, on the test
 
stand. The test included checkouts of the forward and aft skirt purge system. 
There were no revisions recorded against this checkout.
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4.1.7 Hydraulic System
 
Two 	tests were used to verify the operation of the hydraulic system, one a 
manual, and the other an automatic procedure. They were as follows: 
a. 	 Hydraulic system setup and operation. 
b. 	Hydraulic system automatic.
 
4.1.7.1 Setup and Operation, Hydraulic System (1B41005 A) 
Initiated on 15 December 1966 and accepted on 9 January 1967, this checkout 
verified the initial operation setup, as well as the maintenance of system
 
readiness preparatory to static acceptance firing. The operational checks
 
included:
 
a. 	Verification that all hydraulic system components were securely 
installed. 
b. 	 Verification of the proper pump rotation and leak check of the 
entire system. 
c. 	Actuator center check to ascertain the difference between the
 
mechanical center and hydraulic center.
 
d. 	Engine deflection clearance check between the engine, stage and
 
test stand structure, and components.
 
e. 	System refill instructions to replace fluid lost through thermal
 
expansion or closed loop sampling. 
f. 	Instrumentation support to provide hydraulic pressures, positions,
 
and levels.
 
g. 	 Shutdown operations, including a final air content check for system 
performance analysis. 
h. 	 Simulated static firing support through simulation of the engine 
driven pump flow capabilities. 
Four revisions were incorporated in the log sheet. One specified removal and 
proper re-installation of the differential pressure transducers for the pitch 
and 	yaw actuators. Another provided that an integrity check be conducted after 
re-installation of the transducers. One performed certain items per 1B41004. 
One 	required performing certain paragraphs prior to securing the HPU. 
4.1.7.2 Hydraulic System (1B59508 C) 
This automatic checkout, successfully conducted on 16 December 1966, and cert­
ified for filing on 3 January 1967, consisted of the following tests: 
a. 	 Accumulator precharge tesi . 
b. 	Reservoir oil volume switch test.
 
c. 	Reservoir oil pressure transducer test.
 
d. 	Inlet temperature teou.
 
e. 	System pressure test.
 
f. 	Reservoir oil volume position transducer test. 
g. 	Accumulator reservoir oil pressure test.
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h. 	Polarity and linearity tests.
 
i. 	Frequency response tests.
 
j. Engine centering tests. 
All of the foregoing tests were performed when the stage was in the vertical 
position. Five revisions were made to this checkout as follows: 
a. Two revisions were made to correct program errors and Ground Instru­
mentation System problems.
 
b. 	 Two revisions executed backups, one due to suspected engine gimbal 
interference and another due to a line printer malfunction. 
c. 	 One revision explained the reason for program halt 18-1-2. 
There were no discrepancies recorded against this checkout.
 
4.1.8 Integrated Systems Test (IB59514 D)
 
This automatic test verified the functional readiness of the stage and facility
 
to proceed with countdown operations prior to static firing. Included were
 
the 	following checkouts:
 
a. 	 Propellant utilization system checks. 
b. 	Digital data acquisition checks.
 
c. 	Ambient helium pressure checks.
 
d. 	 Checks of critical components such as fill and drain valve. 
e. 	 Engine gimbal checks. 
f. 	Power distribution and voltage tests.
 
Two 	runs were performed. The first was conducted on 29 December 1966 and filed
 
on 7 January 1967. The second run was conducted on 10 January, and was accepted
 
and filed on 12 January 1967. The second run was made to verify selected con­
trol and instrumentation circuits which were invalidated following the simu­
lated static firing procedure when approximately 60 potted bus connectors 
were replaced due to suspected malfunctions.
 
The 	 first run included the following 23 revisions: Five corrected program errors; 
six 	explained and accepted out-of-tolerance values; two entered constants into the
 
program; six explained malfunctions in the test setups not done and steps not 
up to date; one deleted an unnecessary step; one repeated J-2 engine sequence 
tests; one repeated segment 8 of the test; and one turned on the engine con­
trol package power and engine component test power. The second run had 28
 
revisions. Eight accepted values apparently out-of-tolerance; six corrected
 
program errors; two corrected DDT errors; two allowed minor malfunctions which
 
did 	not degrade stage performance; two revisions called for bypassing some 
steps in order to expedite testing; two revisions provided for completing 
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the 	bypassed segments; one provided for concluding the bypassed steps; two
 
entered constants into the program parameters; one completed test setups 
not 	completed; one deleted the self RC check; one turned on the engine con­
trol package power and the engine component test power; and one explained a 
major malfunction (GH2 line pressure), its correction, and retest. 
4.1.9 Static Acceptance Firing Countdown Procedures 
This paragraph covers the static acceptance firing simulated countdown exer­
cise, and the static acceptance firing countdown procedures which were con­
ducted to achieve an acceptable static firing. Also included are reviews of 
the 	critical tasks accomplished as part of the countdown procedure. 
4.1.9.1 Countdown, Acceptance Firing Simulated Exercise (1B70270 NC) 
The 	 simulated countdown number 614075 was initiated on 5 January at 0800 
hours and successfully completed on 6 January 1967 at 1440 hours. With the 
exception of propellant loading, acceptance firing, and residual propellant 
off-loading; the static firing countdown manual demonstrated the overall state 
of readiness of the stage, ground support, and facility equipment to proceed 
with formal countdown activities. Several minor GSE problems were encountered 
during the countdown; however, no holds were required. 
4.1.9.2 Countdown, Acceptance Firing (1B70270 NC) 
This acceptance firing test countdown, number 614076, was started on lU 
January at 0750 hours and culminated in a full duration acceptance firing 
lasting approximately 427 seconds on 12 January 1967 at 1212 hours. The 
following major events were included:
 
a. Loading LOX and 1H2 automatically to the acceptance firing require­
ments.
 
b. 	Propellant tank vent valve relief cycle check.
 
c. 	Acquisition of boil off data.
 
d. 	Critical component cycle tests.
 
e. 	Normal engine start sequence.
 
f. 	 Propellant utilization activation 6 seconds after the engine 
start command. 
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g. 	Engine side load restrainer links release 25 seconds after mainstage 
control. 
h. 	 Initiation of an automatically controlled engine gimbal program
 
following restrainer link release.
 
i. 	 Activation of the secure range safety command system with the required 
command signals sent (255 seconds after simulated lift off) via open
 
loop transmission, and interruption of the system output circuits to 
prevent cutoff and prevalve closure. 
j. 	Movement of the propellant utilization valve after 280 seconds of
 
mainstage control, from the LOX rich stop (5.5 to 1) to the nominal
 
position for the reference mixture ratio (4.7 to 1) for the remainder
 
of the firing duration.
 
k. 	Conducting the control test of the model 188 APS simulators after
 
engine start, during mainstage operation.
 
1. 	 Automatic cutoff initiation at 1933 pounds of LOX or 759 pounds of 
LH2 with the depletion level sensor armed at three per cent residual 
mass as backup. Although minor problems were encountered, the count­
down was completed without the need for a hold. 
Discrepancies were recorded on FARR's A219018 and A219019. 
Run 	1A. Task 14. Propulsion System Test (1B62762 D) 
Conducted on 11 January and accepted on 12 January 1967, as task 14 of the 
countdown, this checkout verified the readiness of the system for static 
firing. Only section five, J-2 engine checkout, was conducted at this time. 
Three revisions were made to the test. One corrected a program error, one
 
explained the loss of talkback from the main LOX valve; and the third 
deleted steps not required at this time. There were no open discrepancies 
at the conclusion of this test.
 
Task 33, Integrated Systems Test (1B59514 D) 
Performed on fl January and accepted on 13 January 1967, this test was con­
ducted as task 33 of the countdown manual, and verified the functional capa­
bility of the stage, GSE,and facility systems to proceed with propellant loading 
and 	subsequent acceptance firing.
 
Twenty-four revisions were made to this checkout as follows: Six revisions 
corrected program errors or set up parameter changes; seven made apparent 
discrepancies acceptable to Engineering; two entered program test constants; 
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two provided for retesting and finishing tests on aft bus 2; one revision 
corrected a DDT error; one reran the J-2 sequence since the sequence oscillo­
graph jammed on the first run; one revision turned on the engine control pack­
age power and engine component test power; one deleted RC self checks; one 
explained why the engine control bottle was not pressurized in time; one 
revision explained an EBW malfunction and rejection; and one allowed for 
deletion of the pretest setup since countdown tasks run to this point ensured 
the proper setup. 
Tasks 39 and 40, Countdown, Propellant Loading (1B59515 C) 
Performed on 12 January and certified for filing on 18 January 1967, as 
tasks 39 and 40 of the countdown manual, this automatic propellant loading 
checkout verified the capability of the facility and GSE to safely transfer
 
LOX, LH2, and GHe to the stage prior to static acceptance firing. The test
 
sequences included:
 
a. LH2 tank pretest purge.
 
b. LOX loading.
 
c. LH2 loading and cold and ambient helium bottles fill.
 
d. Special tests.
 
1. LOX tank overfill sensor check.
 
2. LH2 tank overfill check.
 
3. Flow check of all cold gas circuits.
 
e. LH2 umbilical purge.
 
f. LOX umbilical purge. 
Six revisions were written to this checkout. Three revisions corrected pro­
gram errors; one correctly defined executive cells; one deleted cold helium
 
checks; and the last rejected the chilldown valves because there was no talk­
back. (Reference FARR A219017).
 
Tasks 42 and 43 Countdown, Acceptance Firing (1B59516 C) 
Conducted on 12 January 1967 as tasks 42 and 43 of the countdown manual, this 
checkout exceeded all Engineering standards of acceptance, verifying the 
capability of the stage to function in a hot firing environment generated by 
the J-2 engine under full thrust and full duration conditions. The firing 
lasted approximately 427 seconds. Seven revisions were recorded. Four
 
corrected program errors; one added a time delay after turning off the
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prelaunch checkout group; one explained a chilldown valve talkback mal­
function; and one revision explained a discrepancy on the accumulator.
 
4.1.10 Propulsion System Tests. Postfiring 
Following the successful static firing, three test procedures were accomplished
 
to verify that the structure and function of the propulsion system had 'not
 
been adversely affected by the firing. These tests were the test fittings 
removal procedure, a system leak check, and a propulsion system automatic
 
checkout.
 
4.1.10.1 Propulsion System Test Fittings Removal Procedure (1B70455 A)
 
Performed and accepted by Engineering between 24 and 27 January 1967, this 
manual checkout procedure provided the requirements necessary for configuration 
and conformance verification subsequent to removal of the stage propulsion 
system test installations, and preparatory to final leak checks and removal 
from the test stand. The test installation components removed were replaced
 
with caps, plugs, and/or desiccant covers, as well as applicable seals or
 
gaskets.
 
Four revisions were written to this procedure, providing additional information 
and instructions for test component removals and stage securing. 
There were no discrepancies on record.
 
4.1.10.2 Propulsion System Leak Check (1B70413 A)
 
Performed and completed between 13 and 30 January 1967, subsequent to the
 
full duration static acceptance firing, this leak test verified that the
 
stage propulsion system was acceptable to Engineering while in the test stand.
 
The checks were completed in the VCL.
 
One 	entry was made in the leak check log concerning a leak in the engine bell
 
extension near a drain screw.
 
Five revisions were entered in the log sheet as follows:
 
a. 	One authorized the flow check of the LH2 chilldown shutoff valve
 
and fairing purge system.
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b. One provided a method for obtaining flow rates with flight configur­
ation parameters. 
c. One revision provided a method for observing transducer line purge 
effects on pressure at the transducer. 
d. Another provided for rerunning the previous revision to compare and 
ascertain that approximately the same flows were obtained using a 
valve other than a flight configuration part in the system. 
e. The last revision deleted sections not required. 
4.1.10.3 Propulsion System Test (1B62762 C) 
Section 2 of this checkout was performed on 17 January 1967, and sections
 
1, 3, 4 and 5 were performed on 18 January 1967. Acceptance by Engineering 
was made on 27 January 1967, verifying that the propulsion system was functional, 
subsequent to a full duration static acceptance firing. The test sections 
included: 
a. Pressure switches test. 
b. Pneumatic control system test. 
c. LOX tank pressurization system test. 
d. LH2 tank pressurization system test.
 
e. J-2 engine system test. 
Thirty-one revisions were written to this checkout. Ten corrected errors in 
the program; five accepted out-of-tolerance conditions as not detrimental to 
the system or the test; eight corrected TRD wait time errors; four corrected 
errors to the manual setups; three corrected GSE problems; and one added
 
time data recording requirements for the LH2 vent valve actuation boost close 
and total boost close times.
 
There were no abnormalities on record. 
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4.1.11 Electrical/Electronic System Tests - Postfiring
 
The postfiring Beta Complex test stand electrical/electronic tests performed
 
on the stage prior to installation in the VCL tower were:
 
a. Stage power setup. 
b. Stage power turnoff. 
c. APS interface compatibility. 
d. E34 system. 
e. Electrical preparation.
 
The following tests were not performed in the test stand because they were
 
not included in the Beta Test Area Control Document (TACD), or they were
 
deleted by a TACD revision:
 
a. Power distribution.
 
b. DDAS manual calibration.
 
c. DDAS auto calibration.
 
d. DDAS system auto checkout.
 
e. Range safety receiver manual checkout.
 
f. Range safety receiver auto checkout.
 
g. Range safety system auto checkout.
 
h. PU system calibration.
 
i. PU system auto checkout.
 
j. Cryogenic temperature sensor verification.
 
k. Level sensor and control unit calibration.
 
4.1.11.1 Stage Power Setup (1B59496 C)
 
Conducted on 16 and 17 January 1967, this procedure verified the operational
 
capability of the automatic checkout system (ACS) to control and activate
 
stage electrical power distribution prior to automatic system checkouts.
 
The test also ensured that the stage forward and aft power distribution
 
systems were not subjected to excessive static loads during initial setup 
sequences. It also demonstrated stage system internal switching capabilities. 
There were no revisions or other discrepancies.
 
4.1.11.2 Stage Power Turnoff (1B59497 C)
 
Conducted on 16 January and accepted on 17 January 1967, this automatic check­
out provided the automatic and manual procedures used to shut down stage power
 
distribution after the completion of stage system checkouts.
 
This checkout was successfully completed without any revisions or discrepan­
cies recorded.
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4.1.11.3 APS Interface Compatibility Check (1B60142 ) 
This manual checkout was started on 13 February 1967, and was accepted by Engi­
neering on 28 February 1967. It provided the instructions for conducting con­
tinuity/compatibility tests after the installation of the APS simulators on 
the stand and prior to operational tests on the stage. 
There were three revisions made to this procedure. The first deleted the
 
section pertaining to active APS units. The second corrected a typographical
 
error, and the third changed resistance reading tolerances to correspond to
 
stage wiring changes.
 
No other discrepancies were recorded during the course of this procedure.
 
4.1.11.4 Exploding Bridgewire System, (2B59503 B) 
This checkout defined the manual setup and automatic tasks required to ensure 
the capability of the EBV4 system to initiate ullage rocket ignition and jetti­
son when so commanded in flight by the IU. The checkout was conducted on 
17 January and was certified for filing-on 24 January 1967. The general test
 
sequence was:
 
a. Preliminary EBW firing unit and pulse sensor test. 
b. EBW firing unit pulse sensor self-test. 
c. Ullage rocket ignition firing unit test. 
d. Ullage rocket jettison firing unit test. 
There were no revisions or discrepancies reported during the operation of 
this procedure.
 
4.1.11.5 Electrical Preparation Document (1B71090 A) 
This manual electrical preparation checkout, conducted between 13 and 26
 
January 1967, described the removal and securing of test cables and equipment 
required to perform the prefire tests, simulated static firing, and static 
acceptance firing exercises.
 
Ten revisions were written of which five corrected procedural errors; four 
deleted steps not applicable to the stage or not required at this time; and 
one postponed the performance of a set of steps until the postfire checkouts
 
were completed.
 
There were no discrepancies recorded against this procedure.
 
32 
4.1.12 Hydraulic System Operation and Securing (l4l1006 NC) 
Initiated on 16 January and certified for filing on 26 January 1967, this 
manual checkout verified the postfiring operation, fluid sampling, and 
securing techniques for the hydraulic system installation. This test was 
performed prior to removal from the test stand. 
The tests included the
 
following:
 
a. Ensnning that the hydraulic system installation was complete,
 
and that all system instrumentation was in contact with internal
 
fluid passage.
 
b. 	Hydraulic fluid cleaniness, per MSFC-PROC-166A, based on results
 
of closed loop samples.
 
c. 	Hydraulic system preparation prior to stage removal from the test
 
stand.
 
There was one revision made to this checkout, deleting steps for replacing 
sampled fluid, since the accumulator/reservoir assembly would be replaced. 
There were no discrepancies recorded against this procedure. 
4.1.13 Thermoconditioning System Setup, Operation and Securing (1B4lSS8 B) 
Conducted between 24 and 26 January 1967, this manual checkout verified that 
the forward skirt thermoconditioning system was prepared (the moisture content 
within specified limits) and secured for stage removal from the Beta Complex 
test stand and transfer to the VOL.
 
Eight revisions were made to the procedure as follows: Five deleted steps 
not required for this stage; and three made procedural corrections which
 
reflected the proper configuration.
 
No discrepancies or functional failures were recorded during operation of
 
this procedure.
 
4.1.14 Postfire Propulsion System Checks
 
The 	automatic and manual procedures that were conducted at the VCL, after
 
removal of the stage from the Beta Complex test stand, were:
 
a. 	Manual controls checks.
 
b. 	Propulsion system leak and functional checks.
 
c. 	APS propulsion system checkout.
 
d. 	 APS propulsion system tests. 
e. 	Stage test preparation.
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4.1.14.1 Manual Controls Check (1B70682 A)
 
This manual checkout, performed and accepted by Engineering between-6 and 9
 
February 1967, verified the operational capability of the manually controlled
 
stage propulsion components, and the moisture level of the stage pneumatic
 
control and pressurization sphere.
 
One 	revision was written which altered the helium supply pressure requirements
 
for 	the Model 321 pneumatic console.
 
There were no functional failures on record.
 
4.1.14.2 Propulsion System Leak and Functional Checks (1B70018 A)
 
This checkout procedure defined the operations required to certify the integ­
rity of the stage propulsion systems after static firing.
 
The 	test was initiated on 3 February 1967, and was accepted by Engineering on
 
6 March 1967. It consisted of supplying electrical and/or pneumatic signals­
and 	pressures to stage systems and/or components and checking for proper
 
response and leakage. Stage systems exercised included:
 
a. Vacuum readings, low pressure ducts.
 
b.- Stage pneumatic system leak and functional checks.
 
c. 	Turbopump torque checks.
 
d. 	Engine start bottle leak check.
 
e. 	 Engine check valve reverse flow checks. 
f. 	 Engine GG and exhaust system leak check. 
g. 	 Engine pump purge leak and flow check. 
h. 	 Engine thrust chamber leak check. 
i. 	 Engine pneumatic leak and functional checks. 
j. 	 LH2 tank pressurization system leak and functional checks. 
k. 	LOX tank pressurization system leak and functional checks.
 
1. 	 LOX tankage leak and flow checks. 
m. 	 LH2 tankage leak and flow checks. 
n. 	LH2 and LOX vent system leak checks.
 
Four discrepancies were written during this checkout and recorded on IIS
 
302675 as follows:
 
a. 	Item No. 1 - Flow meter readings were taken but the conversion
 
charts were illegible - subsequent replacement of the conversion
 
charts corrected the problem.
 
b. 	Item No. 2 - A leak check plug was missing from the thrust chamber pres­
sure port - a plug was installed and the leak check was accomplished. 
c. 	Item No. 3 - Recapped an IiS from the stage mechanical records against
 
a leak at the drain screw on the J-2 engine bell extension - the leak 
was 	corrected.
 
d. 	Item No. 4 - A leak of 390 scims at the LOX vent elbow, P/N 1D52598,
 
should have been 55 scims maximum. The leak was not corrected but was
 
recapped to FARR A241916.
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4.1.14.2 (Continued) 
Fourteen leakage conditions were recorded during this procedure as follows: 
a. 	 Four leaks were recapped to FARR's A241901 and A241916. 
b. 	 Four leaks were repaired by replacement of seals. 
c. 	 Three leaks were repaired by retightening connections to proper 
torque value. 
d. 	Three leaks were repaired by rewelding.
 
Sixty-seven revisions were written to this checkout with two being voided.
 
The 	revisions incorporated were:
 
a. 	Twenty-nine revisions revised steps to be compatible with the
 
test configuration with five resulting from R/NAA requirements
 
and four resulting from shortages.
 
b. 	Twenty-one revisions added steps that were omitted, including
 
four that were R/NAA requirements.
 
c. 	Thirteen revisions deleted steps that were not compatible with the
 
test configuration including one that was a requirement of R/NAA
 
and five that were the result of previously accomplished steps.
 
d. 	Two revisions required a rerun of previously accomplished steps to
 
checkout a replaced assembly and a modification by R/NAA.
 
4.1.14.3 APS Propulsion System Checkout (IB70491 A)
 
This procedure was used to checkout the functional integrity of the auxiliary
 
propulsion system, when mated to the stage. Checkout was performed on APS
 
module P/N 1A83785-531, S/N 2008-1, installed in position 1 (Position Plane 
I) and on module P/N 1A83785-531, S/N 2008-2, installed in position 2 
(Position Plane III). The purpose of this procedure was to verify that each
 
APS 	would function satisfactorily per design requirements.
 
This test was initiated and accepted by Engineering on 9 March 1967, and
 
included the following checks:
 
a. 	Low pressure function of APS valves and systems.
 
b. 	Bellows position indicators in both the extended and collapsed
 
positions.
 
c. '-,Manuallypressurized the APS system to blanket pressures: 
1. 	Monitored for prescribed time to verify no pressure loss.
 
2. 	Performed automatic scan to check ullage and sphere
 
transducers.
 
3. 	 Performed functional test of engine quad valves. 
Eleven revisions were written to this procedure. Five deleted steps no longer
 
required, five revised sequence requirements, and one changed a tolerance call­
out 	to be compatible with instrumentation accuracy.
 
There were no functional failures on record.
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4.1.14.4 Auxiliary Propulsion System Test (1B66917 A)
 
Initiated on 9 March and accepted by Engineering on 13 March 1967, this auto­
matic checkout procedure verified that the response signals from the APS system
 
were favorable. The telemetry response was verified on the pressure transducers,
 
helium high and low pressure systems, and the MAG amp output associated with
 
the propellant quad valve current.
 
Two revisions were written to this checkout. One corrected an error in the
 
program, and one corrected a pressure tolerance to agree with manual setup
 
procedure 1B70491. 
There were no discrepancies recorded.
 
4.1.14.5 Stage Test Preparation (1B70684 A) 
This manual checkout, commenced on 30 January 1967, and accepted on 22 March 
1967, verified the configuration of those stage propulsion systems test 
installations which are required for stage checkout at the VCL, Sacramento. 
The major test installations included:
 
a. Stage purge system securing. 
b. APS umbilical pressurization securing. 
c. LOX and LH2 fill and drain umbilical connections. 
d. LOX vent connection.
 
e. LH2 ground and non-propulsive vent connections.
 
f. Pneumatic supply and vent umbilical connections.
 
g. Stage monitor panel connections. 
h. Auxiliary pressurization systems connection. 
Eleven revisions were written to this procedure for: Five revised callouts 
due to updated configuration, three clarified procedure requirements, two
 
were temporary requirements, and one revised the procedure to accommodate a
 
part shortage.
 
No FARR's were written during the operation of this procedure. 
4.1.15 Electrical/Electronic Checks - VCL
 
The electrical/electronic tests performed in the VCL tower after stage install­
ation verified the integrity of the stage systems after static firing. The 
following tests were accomplished:
 
a. Stage power setup. 
b. Stage power turnoff. 
4.1.15 (Continued)
 
c. Power distribution.
 
d. DDAS auto checkout.
 
e. Range safety receiver manual checkout.
 
f. Range safety receiver auto checkout.
 
g. PU system auto checkout
 
4.1.15.1 Stage Power Setup (1B59590 E)
 
Initiated and accepted by Engineering on 7 March 1967, this procedure verified
 
the capability of the ACS to control and activate stage electrical power prior
 
to the initiation of stage automatic checkout procedures.
 
Three revisions were written to correct program errors.
 
There were no discrepancies recorded.
 
4.1.15.2 Stage Power Turnoff (1B59591 D)
 
Initiated and accepted by Engineering on 7 March 1967, this procedure verified 
the capability of the GSE to shutdown the stage power distribution system 
after completion of various system checkout procedures. 
No revisions or discrepancies were recorded.
 
4.1.15.3 Power Distribution System (1B59592 D)
 
Performed on 7 March 1967, and accepted by Engineering on 15 March 1967, this
 
automatic checkout verified the capability of the forward and aft power
 
distribution assemblies to supply electrical power, as required through power
 
switching networks, to the various stage systems.
 
The forward power distribution system consisted of two 28 vdc power sources.
 
The aft power distribution system consisted of one 28 vdc power source, and
 
one 56 vdc power source. In addition to the main power sources, each power
 
distributor contained a 28 vdc talkback bus to provide talkback indication
 
voltage for the GSE. The specific tests verified by this checkout were:
 
a. Static loads on power buses were within specified tolerances.
 
b. Proper operation of all switching circuits for power distribution.
 
Six revisions were written to this procedure; four corrected errors in the 
program, and two provided specific instructions to perform the chilldown
 
inverter frequency and voltage checks. 
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4.1.15.3 (Continued) 
There were no discrepancies on record.
 
4.1.15.4 Digital Data Acquisition System (1B59594 E)
 
This automatic digital data acquisition system checkout, performed on 10 
March and accepted by Engineering on 16 March 1967, provided the operational 
status verification of all stage data channels with the exception of those 
data channels tested and accepted during specific systems tests (i.e. Exploding 
Bridgewire, Range Safety, etc.)
 
There were thirteen revision to this procedure for the following: 
a. 	Nine corrected program errors involving tolerances, OSTOL
 
statements, and changed set and reset commands that were not
 
applicable for this checkout.
 
b. 	 Four altered the program to perform the PCM/FM test last. 
4.1.15.5 Range Safety Receiver Manual Operations (1B59829 D)
 
This manual checkout, performed and accepted by Engineering on 8 March 1967, 
gave necessary instructions for test equipment setup and-manual operations
 
performed in conjunction with automatic range safety receiver H&C0 1B59596.
 
The 	 purpose of this H&CO was to aid in the determination of the flight readi­
ness of the range safety receiver system.
 
One 	revision was written which altered the non-end item equipment requirements
 
due 	to unavailability of equipment.
 
There were'no discrepancies on record.
 
4.1.15.6 Range Safety Receiver Checks (1B59596 D)
 
Initiated on 8 March and accepted by Engineering on 10 March 1967, this 
automatic checkout verified that the range safety receivers met or exceeded all 
Engineering requirements and standards of acceptance for AGC calibration and 
drift, minimum acceptable deviation sensitivity, and minimum acceptable RF 
sensitivity. 
No revisions or discrepancies were recorded.
 
38 
4.1.15.7 Propellant Utilization System Check (lB59481 D) 
This automatic checkout provided the procedures by which the design integrity 
and operational capabilities of the propellant utilization (PU) system were 
The PU system test verified
reverified after static firing of the stage. 

the ability of the system to determine and control the engine propellant flow
 
mixture ratio in a manner that would ensure simultaneous propellant depletion.
 
The test further verified that static firing had no detrimental affect on
 
the capabilities of the system to control the LOX and LH2 fill and topping
 
valves and to measure propellant levels.
 
The test was accomplished on 10 March 1967, and was accepted by Engineering
 
on the same date.
 
There were five revisions made to this drawing. One deleted steps required
 
to feed the PU values into the computer, as these values had been recorded on
 
paper tape during the prefire checkouts and were entered prior to the start of
 
this test. One relocated a command to return the PU valve to the center posi­
tion, as the original program could not accomplish centering. One revision
 
corrected a program error. One increased the time between steps from 35
 
microseconds to 5 seconds, to allow the PU valve time to slew to the end stop
 
before measuring the valve position. One revision repeated a step that had
 
indicated a malfunction; however, the malfunction did not reoccur and the
 
test continued with no other problems.
 
4.1.16 Hydraulic System Setup, Operation, and Securing (1B41007 A)
 
The purpose of this manual checkout was to provide instructions to setup,
 
operate, and secure the stage hydraulic system, P/N 1B62563, and to maintain
 
the system free of contaminants during operation. This procedure also checked
 
for engine operational clearance between the engine, stage, and test stand
 
structures while the stage was in the VCL for postfire testing.
 
This test procedure was initiated on 1 March 1967, and was completed and
 
accepted on 27 March 1967.
 
After completion of the operational checks, the hydraulic system was prepared
 
for shipment by depressurizing the stage air supply bottles and the accumu­
lator/reservoir. All auxiliary equipment was removed and all sample ports
 
were capped.
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4.1.16 (Continued)
 
The eight-revisions written during the operation of the procedure were:
 
a. One changed a connection point for the pressure and return hoses 
from the circulation disconnects on the HPU to a "U" tube assembly. 
b. One deleted the Test Control Center setup requirements, as engine 
gimballing was accomplished by using the gimbal control unit. 
c: The next change was a repeat of the accumulator/reservoir and 
stage air supply bottle charging. This was necessary to bring 
the bottle pressure to proper levels for running the all systems 
test being run concurrently with this procedure. 
d. One changed the call out for a maintenance and calibration procedure 
for the nitrogen fill truck from 1A37963 to 1B56800. The 3137963 
drawing was applicable to the SIV program only. 
e; One added a requirement for refilling the stage hydraulic system to 
replace hydraulic fluid lost overboard through the reservoir over­
board vent. 
f. One revision deleted another revision. 
-
g. One 
"M" 
added a torque value of 140 inch-pounds 
on the auxiliary pump case. 
for bleed plug 
4.1:17 Postfiring Thermoconditioning Checks 
The 	 forward and aft skirt thermoconditioning checks were conducted to ensure 
that firing-the stage engine did not create any conditions detrimental to the
 
stage. The checks were performed by the following two tests:
 
a. 	 Forward skirt thermoconditioning system operating and checkout 
- -procedure. 
b. 	 Aft skirt and interstage thermoconditioning and purging system 
checkout. 
4.1.17.1 Forward Skirt Thermoconditioning System Operating and Checkout 
Procedure (1B57599 C)
 
Initiated on 1 February 1967, and accepted by Engineering on 27 March 1967,
 
this manual postfire checkout verified the .capability of the forward skirt
 
thermoconditioning system to provide a heat sink or heat source, as required, 
for 	the electrical/electronic equipment mounted on panels in the forward skirt.
 
The panels, aluminum alloy with a honeycomb core (bonded sandwich construction)
 
and machined passages, provided a thermally conditioned water/methanol solu­
tion via the supply and return manifolds connected to the Model DSV-hB-359 
thermoconditioning system servicer, P/N 1A78829-1. 
Twelve revisions were written to this checkout: Five provided additional 
purge times to reduce the dewpoint to an acceptable level; six supplied steps
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4.1.17.1 	(Continued)
 
to prevent the backup of high pressure gaseous nitrogen into the R-12 Freon
 
bottle supply; and one changed the acceptable dewpoint level from 250F to
 
40'F.
 
There were no discrepancies on record.
 
4.1.17.2 	 Aft Skirt and Interstage Thermoconditioning and Purging System 
Checkout (1B556S5 A) 
This manual procedure proofed, leak checked, and reverified the functional
 
capabilities of the stage after static firing. The test was started on 1
 
February 1967, and completed on 2 February 1967, without encountering any 
problems. 
One revision was written against the procedure to delete the helium bottle
 
shroud flow test. This test is only for the S-V configuration stage. No
 
FARR's were generated during this test.
 
4.l.18 All Systems Test (1B65533 B) 
The primary purpose of this checkout, conducted on 16 March 1967, and accepted
 
by Engineering on 29 March 1967, was to verify the basic operation of all
 
systems on the stage, i.e., electrical, hydraulic, telemetry, propulsion, etc.
 
This checkout followed, where practical, the actual flight sequence of events
 
which included: prelaunch operations, simulated liftoff, ullage firing,
 
engine start, hydraulic gimballing, engine cutoff, coast period, attitude
 
control, and shutdown.
 
The all systems test was conducted in a two-fold operation: The first was
 
executed with the umbilicals connected to maintain complete control of the
 
stage; and the second was performed with the umbilicals ejected at simulated
 
lift-off, 	while all on-board systems were exercised to ensure operational 
capability.
 
Twenty revisions were written against the procedure: Twelve corrected errors 
in the program; five deleted portions previously accomplished; two added in­
structions to facilitate performance of the umbilicals-out portion; and one
 
corrected 	the time data information for the auxiliary hydraulic pump. 
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The following FARR's were written-during this checkout: A245511, Fuel-

Depletion Sensor; A219067, Common Bulkhead; A241916,.Excessive Leakage;
 
and A245515, Measurement Transducer M069.
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4.2 Stage Checkout, Space Systems Center 
Paragraph 4.2 describes the tests performed on the stage, after basic 
assembly and prior to shipment from Douglas SSC to STC. The stage 
entered tower 5 on 10 August 1966. Checkout activities consumed 39 
two-shift working days between 18 August and 12 October 1966. On the 
latter date, the stage was turned over to Manufacturing for final
 
inspection and preparation for shipment.
 
The thirty-four tests required per End Item Test Plan, 1B66532, were
 
completed. The LOX mass probe, P/N 1A48430-509, LOX feed duct, P/N
 
1A49969-503, and LH2 feed duct, P/N 1A49320-503, were short at the time
 
of the all systems test. Interim use parts were installed for testing
 
purposes.
 
Paragraphs 4.2.1 to 4.2.6 contain information on the six major areas 
tested: Umbilical Mechanical Mating; Environmental Control System;
 
Electrical/Electronic Systems; Propulsion System; Hydraulic System;
 
and All Systems. 
4.2.1 Umbilical Mechanical Mating
 
Two test procedures were conducted to perform mechanical mating checks
 
on the forward and aft umbilical kits. The umbilical kits are the inter­
face link connecting the stage to GSE electrical, pneumatic, and environ­
mental conditioning functions, and must be properly mated before stage
 
systems tests can be conducted. The two procedures involved in this
 
check were:
 
a. Umbilical kit, aft - checkout stand.
 
b. Umbilical kit, forward - checkout stand. 
4.2.1.1 Umbilical Kit, Aft - Checkout Stand (IA57918F)
 
Handling and installation of the aft umbilical kit, P/N 1A57917-1, took 
place on 26 August 1966, with Engineering certification on 13 October 1966. 
Three revisions to the procedure included one which updated steps per
 
EO 1A57917-1J, and two which deleted items which were either not required,
 
or were previously accomplished.
 
No failure and rejection reports were prepared.
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4.2.1.2 Umbilical Kit, Forward - Checkout Stand (1A57920 C) 
The forward umbilical kit was installed on the stage on 26 August 1966, 
in preparation for automatic checkout activities. 
No revisions or other deviations were .noted against this procedure, which
 
was certified by Engineering on 12 October 1966.
 
4.2.2 Environmental Control System Tests 
Four procedures were run to ensure the integrity and operation of the for­
ward skirt thermoconditioning System, before and after systems checkout 
activities, and to determine the functional capability and flow distribution 
of the aft skirt and interstage purge system. These procedures were: 
a. Forward skirt thermoconditioiiing system checkout. 
b. Forward skirt thermoconditioning system operation. 
c. Forward skirt thermoconditioning system securing.
 
d. Aft skirt and interstage thermoconditioning and purge system.
 
4.2.2.1 Forward Skirt Thermoconditioning System Checkout (iB41926 A) 
The pretesting checkout of the forward skirt thermoconditioning system,
 
run on 22 August and accepted on 3 October 1966, prepared the system for 
final acceptance checkout. The ability of the system to support stage
 
testing activities was established.
 
There were no revisions entered in the log sheet, and no failure and
 
rejection reports were prepared.
 
4.2.2.2 Forward Skirt Thermoconditioning System Operating Procedure 
(1B42124 A) 
The setup and operation of the Model DSV-4B-359 thermoconditioning s st'em 
servicer were completed on 23 August 1966. Acceptance was made by
 
Engineering on 13 October 1966. The servicer was used during stage system 
checkouts to provide water/methanol heat transfer fluid to the forward 
skirt electronic components area.
 
No revisions or functional discrepancies were written up.
 
4.2.2.3 Forward Skirt Thermoconditioning System Securing (1262965 A) 
Conducted and accepted on 11 and 12 October 1966, this procedure determined 
the system cleanliness, integrity, and readiness for stage shipment to STC. 
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4.2.2.3 (Continued)
 
The cleanliness check ensured that the water/methanol heat transfer fluid
 
was free of contaminants, the leak check established that system leakages
 
did not exceed allowable values, and the preparation for shipment included
 
assurance that the system moisture level was within specified limits.
 
One revision noted in the log sheet pertained to drying a line in a restrictor
 
assembly. No functional failures resulted. 
4.2.2.4 Aft Skirt and Interstage Thermoconditioning and Purge System 
(1B4o544 NC)
 
The proper flow distribution of the aft skirt and interstage thermo­
conditioning and purge system was verified between 26 and 29 August 1966. 
There were three revisions in the log sheet, of which one clarified a step,
 
one added an item which had been omitted, and one revision added two ori­
fices, which were necessitated by the deletion of two Cannon plugs. No 
defects were encountered.
 
4.2.3 Electrical/Electronic System Tests
 
Eleven subparagraphs of this paragraph describe the eighteen procedures 
used to checkout the stage electrical/electronics systems. These subpara­
graphs are as follows:
 
a. Power distribution tests. 
b. Continuity compatibility tests.
 
c. Propellant utilization system tests. 
d. Level sensor and control unit calibration. 
e. Exploding bridgewire test.
 
f. Range safety system tests.
 
g. Cryogenic temperature sensor verification. 
h. Signal conditioning setup. 
i. Digital data acquisition system tests.
 
j. Telemetry and range safety antenna system check.
 
k. APS simulator test. 
4.2.3.1 Power Distribution Tests
 
The checkout of the stage forward and aft power distribution systems was 
accomplished, and the ability of the ACS to control stage power functions
 
was established, by the following three procedures:
 
a. Stage power setup.
 
b. Stage power turnoff.
 
c. Power distribution system checkout.
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4.2.3.1.1 Stage Power Setup (1B59590 B) 
Verification that the ACS could activate and control stage power distri­
bution, as well as assurance that proper loads were present on all power 
buses, were established on 5 September 1966. The results of testing were 
accepted on 7 September 1966. 
The thirteen revisions to the procedure included eight which corrected pro­
gram and DDT curve errors. The remaining five pertained to incorporating 
a circuit change per EO IB53925K; reflecting latest dash numbers; ensuring 
that all cables had been installed; and agreeing with drawing 1B43561H, 
There were no other discrepancies noted.
 
4.2.3.1.2 Stage Power Turnoff (lB59591 B)
 
The automatic checkout system was used to remotely shut down stage power
 
distribution on 8 September 1966. The results were accepted on the same
 
date, and no revisions or other discrepancies were indicated.
 
4.2.3.1.3 Power Distribution System (1B59592 B)
 
The automatic checkout of the stage power distribution system was activated
 
on 8 September and accepted on 23 September 1966. At the same time, the
 
ability of the ACS to control stage power switching was confirmed.
 
The 	eight revisions to the procedure included:
 
a. 	One requiring that the stage power setup test results
 
tape remain loaded.
 
b. 	 One inserting a time delay. 
c. 	 One calling out the correct setting for the SIN channel 43. 
d. 	 One calling for and describing frequency and voltage checks 
on the chilldown inverter. 
e. 	 One changing the procedure to comply with NASA technical
 
directive I-V-S-IVB-64-TD-56.
 
f. 	 One reflecting the rewiring of the EEW pulse sensor indicator. 
g. 	 One deleting a measurement due to a parts shortage. 
h. 	 One correcting a minor error. 
No system malfunctions were encountered. 
4.2.3.2 Continuity Compatibility Tests 
Two test procedures were run to verify the integrity of the stage electrical 
wiring. The tests were: 
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a. Continuity compatibility check.
 
b. Umbilical interface compatibility check.
 
4.2.3.2.1 Continuity Compatibility Check (1B59763 D)
 
This procedure was run between 18 August and 1 September 1966, to establish
 
the integrity of the stage electrical wiring. Resistance measurements were
 
taken between connectors, and between the terminals in each connector, to
 
accomplish this objective. The test results were accepted by Engineering
 
on 2 September 1966. There were six revisions entered in the documentation
 
log sheet. Two changed numerous resistance callouts, either because of
 
variations in the length, type, and gauge of wire; or because measurements
 
had been taken through 49.9 ohm resistance modules. New measurements were
 
added by two revisions, because transducers D104 and D225 had been added;
 
and because of the "F" change. to drawing 1B53326. The final two revisLons 
corrected procedural errors.
 
Two failure and rejection reports were written to reflect defects in stage
 
wiring, which were discovered during this test.
 
FARR A216726 noted that the rubber insert in plug P16 of wire harness, P/N
 
1B58192-1, S/N 00004, was damaged between pins G and H. The condition was
 
accepted for use. FARR A216727 reported on a damaged rubber insert at
 
pin B of plug P29 on wire harness 404W7, P/N 1B58196-1. This defect was also
 
acceptable to Engineering.
 
4.2.3.2.2 Umbilical Interface Compatibility Check (1B59768 A)
 
the steps outlinedConducted and accepted between 26 and 29 August 1966, 
in this document established the integrity of the stage umbilical wiring.
 
It was demonstrated that proper loads were present on all power busses, andthat 
the control circuits for the stage propulsion valves and safety items were
 
within prescribed tolerances.
 
Two procedural revisions specified checkout of four safety items, which had
 
been omitted from the procedure; and deleted two steps, which were no longer
 
required.
 
No functional failures occurred.
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4.2.3.3 Propellant Utilization System Tests 
A manual calibration and an automatic checkout were conducted in conjunction 
with one another to verify the ability of the stage propellant utilization 
system to control the mixture ratio of the fuel and oxidizer propellants. 
4.2.3.3.1 Propellant Utilization System Calibration (1B59826 C) 
Run on 9 September and accepted by Engineering on 12 September 1966, this 
procedure provided the manual requirements for the calibration of the
 
propellant utilization system. These included:
 
a. Verification of static inverter/converter output voltages.
 
b. LH2 and LOX bridge empty and full calibration.
 
c. Data acquisition of the LH2 and LOX bridge position.
 
d. LH2 and LOX bridge slew checks (1/3 and 2/3 slew).
 
e. Reference mixture ratio (RMR) calibration. 
f. LH2 and LOX bridge linearity checks.
 
g. Verification of hardwire loading circuits. 
Of the four revisions entered in the documentation log sheet, two corrected
 
minor procedure errors, one noted identification of Sacramento peculiar
 
distribution boxes, and one called for turning off a dc voltmeter to
 
conserve test set batteries.
 
No malfunctions occurred while calibrating the PU system. 
4.2.3.3.2 Propellant Utilization System (IB59481 B) 
The operational capability of the propellant utilization system to regulate 
the engine mixture ratio to ensure minimum propellent residue at engine 
cutoff was established on 12 September 1966, after two runs. The first 
test run was invalidated because of incorrect cable connections from the 
Model 279 instrument checkout, unit to the stage. The second run was com­
pleted satisfactorily with the following six revisions: 
a. One revision defined the proper reference procedure. 
b. One specified the correct drawing for the load ratio values.
 
c. A revision accounted for the rewiring of the EIh pulse sensor. 
d. A measurement was deleted because a part had not been
 
installed.
 
e. Two errors in the program were corrected.
 
No deviations requiring the preparation of failure reports were encountered. 
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4.2.3.4 Level Sensor and Control Unit Calibration (1B59821 C)
 
Between 30 and 31 August 1966, this document was used to check out the
 
liquid level sensor systems, and the LOX and LH2 tank overfill and fast 
fill sensor systems. The operating point of each sensor was set to a
 
level well within the limits of the capacitance change created in these
 
units by a simulated wet condition RACS command.
 
No revisions or other discrepancies were observed during testing.
 
4.2.3.5 Exploding Bridgewire System (1B59597 B)
 
One run was. required to perform the functional checkout of the EBW system
 
on 8 September 1966. The testing sequence was:
 
a. Preliminary EBW firing unit and pulse sensor test.
 
b. EBW firing unit pulse sensor self test.
 
c. Ullage rocket ignition firing unit test. 
d. Ullage rocket jettison firing unit test.
 
The four revisions to the procedure included two correcting errors, one
 
incorporating a circuit change per EO 1B53925K, and one deleting a measure­
ment because parts were not installed.
 
No system problems were encountered.
 
4.2.3.6 Range Safety System Tests
 
The checkout of the range safety system consisted of the following three
 
procedures:
 
a. Range safety receiver manual checkout. 
b. Range safety receiver automatic checkout. 
c. Range safety system automatic checkout. 
4.2.3.6.1 Range Safety Receiver Manual Operations (1B59829 B)
 
Completed satisfactorily on 14 September 1966, these manual operations
 
consisted of steps and setups, complementing the automatic H&CO 1B59596,
 
which could not be performed automatically. Engineering certified the
 
"as-run" results on 15 September 1966. There were seven revisions noted
 
in the log sheet. Five corrected minor errors in the procedure, one set
 
the mode switch to the CW position, and one reset it to the automatic
 
configuration position.
 
No other deviations were encountered.
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4.2.3.6.2 Range Safety Receiver Checks (1B59596 B)
 
Activated on 14 September,and accepted on 15 September 1966, the range
 
safety receiver checkout tested for AGC calibration and drift, minimum
 
acceptable deviation sensitivi:ty; and minimum acceptable RF sensitivity, 
before the system checkout was performed. Manual H&OO 1B59829 was per­
formed in conjunction with this test. 
There were seven revisions noted in the dociimentatioh log sheet, of which
 
three corrected program errors. One added items which had been omitted;
 
one 	set a breakpoint; one deleted a measurement due to a parts shortage; 
and 	one changed the procedure per NASA technical directive I-V-S-IVB-64-TD-56.
 
No defects were noted.
 
4.2.3.6.3 Range Safety System (IB59482 B) 
The functional verification of the range safety system took place on 15 
September 1966, and was accepted on 21 September 1966. One run was required 
to accomplish this task, which was composed of the following segments:
 
a. 	 EBW and receiver external/internal power transfer test. 
b. 	Engine cutoff test.
 
c. 	 Pulse sensor and propellant dispersion command inhibit test. 
d. 	 In-flight turnoff command test­
e. 	 Arm and engine cutoff command test. -. o 
f. 	Propellant dispersion command test. 
g. 	 Safe and arm device test. 
Eleven revisions were recorded in the log sheet, as follows: 
a. Two were written to account for rewiring the EH pulse sensor 
indicator.
 
b. 	 Two revisions corrected program errors. 
c. 	 The probedure was changed by one revision per NASA letter 
R-QUAL-P/DAC-387-66. 
d. 	Two ineasurements were deleted; one because of a parts shortage,'
 
and the second because it was no longer required.
 
e. ,Two revisions pertained to the setup of ground support
 
equipment.
 
f. 	Two revisions set breakpoints where necessary.
 
There were no failure and rejectioh re'ports prepared.
 
4.2.3.7 Cryogenic Temperature Sensor Verification (IB59818.B) 
Those temperature transducers for which the normal operating range did not 
include ambient (room) temperature were checked out per this procedure 
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between 26 August and 28 September 1966.
 
No revisions to the procedure were noted in the log sheet; however, two
 
failure and rejection reports were prepared as a result of discontinuities
 
discovered. FARR A216728 noted that there was no continuity between pins
 
B and E of plug 404W208 P45, of LOX probe, P/N IB41769-401. The probe
 
was removed and replaced. FARR A216729 reported that no continuity existed
 
between pins 2 and 3 of plug 403A200 J4, P/N 1B58136. The plug was dis­
assembled and no wiring defect was found. It was then reassembled, and
 
continuity was established.
 
4.2.3.8 Signal Conditioning Setup (1B59822 C) 
Run between 29 August and 20 September 1966, the signal conditioning 
setup served to calibrate all signal conditioning equipment, when it 
was found out-of-tolerance; or when a component was replaced and found 
out-of-tolerance. It was also used to troubleshoot instrumentation prob­
lems during computer holds, and to verify the calibration of the 5 vdc and 
20 vdc excitation modules. The data obtained in testing per this docu­
ment were accepted by Engineering on 7 October 1966. 
There were six revisions entered in the log sheet. One added an item
 
omitted from the procedure; two corrected minor errors; one changed the
 
procedure to agree with IPCL drawing 1B43561F; one changed steps to com­
ply with production test drawing 1B27777; and another revision added a
 
test cable which was compatible with the 5 vdc excitation module.
 
No malfunctions were noted during the test.
 
4.2.3.9 Digital Data Acquisition System Tests
 
The digital data acquisition system was operationally examined and checked
 
out through the performance of two calibration procedures, one manual and
 
one automatic, followed by an automatic system checkout procedure. These
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procedures verified that the PCM/FM/FM portion of the stage telemetry
 
system, including all multiplexers and submultiplexed channels, were
 
operating properly. These procedures were:
 
a. DDAS calibration, manual operations.
 
b. DDAS calibration, automatic
 
c. DDAS automatic checkout.
 
4.2.3.9.1 Digital Data Acquisition System Manual Calibration
(1B59823 C)
 
Those manual operations required for the calibration of the PCM/FM/FM
 
digital data acquisition system were performed between 1 and 7 September
 
1966, with acceptance taking place on 12 September. A second issue, run
 
because the remote analog submultiplexer, P/N 1B54062-503, had been replaced
 
(reference FARR A216730), was completed and accepted on 21 and 22 September
 
1966, respectively.
 
There were eight revisions to the first issue, including three adding
 
the Model 726 electrical checkout adapter accessory kit, and five adding
 
a Model PD3650 power supply to check out the 20 vdc power sources.
 
The two revisions to the second issue pertained to provisions for re­
testing the RASM.
 
FARR A216730, referenced above, is further detailed in paragraph 4.2.3.9.3.
 
No other malfunctions were noted.
 
4.2.3.9.2 Digital Data Acquisition System Automatic Calibration
 
(B59593 B)
 
Conducted in conjunction with manual calibration H&CO 1B59823, this
 
procedure verified that the components of the PCM/FM/FM system were within
 
specified tolerances. The test was run between 1 and 7 September 1966,
 
incorporating the following sixteen revisions:
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a. Four noting that the system was to be tested to the -503 
configuration test requirements. 
b. Three deleting steps which were no longer required, and one 
deleting a measurement because of a parts shortage. 
c. Four revisions adding the Model 726A electrical checkout 
adapter and the Model 296 telemetry signal distribution 
unit to the list of end item test equipment. 
d. 	Two changing part numbers to bring the procedure up to
 
date.
 
e. 	A revision corrected an error, and another reflected
 
rewiring of the EBW pulse sensor.
 
Failure of RASM, P/N 1B54062-503, to sync when troubleshooting a temper­
ature measurement resulted in its replacement (reference FARR A216730). 
This necessitated a reissue of the procedure, in order to verify the 
calibration of the RASM. This second issue, completed on 21 September 
1966, incorporated three revisions. One of these authorized the rerun, 
one corrected an error, and one noted the rewiring of the EBW pulse 
sensor.
 
FARR A216730, reporting on the above mentioned RASM, is detailed further
 
in paragraph 4.2.3.9.3. No other defects were noted.
 
4.2.3.9.3 Digital Data Acquisition System (1B59594 0)
 
Four runs were required before the DDAS automatic checkout could be com­
pleted on 22 September 1966. The first three runs were incomplete due
 
to various necessary adjustments, to program errors, and parts shortages.
 
The remote analog submultiplexer, P/N 1B54062-503, was replaced prior to
 
the final run.
 
All 	channels having signal insertion capability were compared, one at
 
a time, to their tolerance limits, using the D924A computer. Channels 
without RACS capability were compared to their tolerance limits at
 
ambient conditions. The results of this testing were accepted by
 
Engineering on 30 September 1966.
 
The 	 following thirty-one revisions appeared in the revision documentation 
log 	sheet:
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a. 	Ten corrected errors in the procedure or program, four added
 
items which had been omitted, and two clarified the procedure.
 
b. 	A revision specified power supply requirements for additional
 
hardwire measurements.
 
c 
 One revision accepted indications of excessive noise which
 
were due to high gain of the RASM.
 
d. 	A parts shortage caused a measurement to be deleted.
 
e. 	 Two revisions pertained to the rewiring of the EBW pulse 
sensor indicator. 
f. 	 Another revision pointed out that the hydraulic system had 
been pressurized during the course of this test. 
g. 	 Another specified the use of an AC voltmeter and counter. 
h. 	 Portions of the procedure were rerun per two revisions, after 
a PCM malfunction and after a transducer was replaced. 
i. 	One revision corrected a drawing number.
 
j. 	 Two added necessary time delays. 
k. 	 A revision provided for the insertion of actual log book 
values. 
1. 	 One set the PAM ground station in the correct mode. 
m. 	 Another called for verification that all channels were RACS 
tested.
 
Two failure and rejection reports were written during the course of 
testing per this procedure. PARR A216730 reported that remote analog 
submultiplexer, P/N 1B54062-503, S/N 018, failed to sync. The unit
 
was found to be acceptable upon retest. FARR A216734 noted that trans­
ducer, P/N 1B40242-533, S/N 533-12, was intermittent. Retest failed to
 
reproduce the defect, and the transducer was accepted for use.
 
4.2.3.10 Telemetry and Range Safety Antenna System (1B59819 B) 
The function of the telemetry and range safety antenna system was verified 
between 24 August and 2 September 1966, with Engineering acceptance of 
the results taking place on 12 September 1966. 
The 	eighteen revisions to the procedure included:
 
a. 	One complying with new data requirements.
 
b. 	 Five adding items omitted from the procedure. 
c. 	 Five making minor procedural corrections, and three clarifying 
the procedure.
 
d. Two revisions widened tolerances, and two pertained to modi­
fying a Z-Theta table. 
No malfunctions were noted.
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4.2.3.11 APS Simulator Test (1B59601 B)
 
Conducted and accepted on 9 September 1966, this test established that
 
a suitable electrical interface existed between the stage and the APS
 
modules. For purposes of testing, APS module electrical simulators,
 
Model DSV-4B-188, were employed in place of the actual modules.
 
Included in the test sequence were:
 
a. 	Verification that bus power could be applied, and that static
 
loads were not excessive.
 
b. 	Verification that attitude control commands from the IU
 
controlled the proper sets of quad-redundant solenoids.
 
c. 	Verification of the telemetry system associated with the APS.
 
Of the six revisions to the procedure, two corrected errors, two enabled
 
the operator to manually test the APS relay modules, one set a break­
point, and the final revision added an item which had been omitted. 
No functional failures were encountered. 
4.2.4 Propulsion System Tests 
Eight procedures were required to completely verify the function and 
integrity of all propulsion system components. The eight tests were:
 
a. 	 Propulsion system control console. 
b. 	 LH2 tank pressurization system leak check. 
c. 	Pneumatic control system leak check.
 
d. 	 Cold helium system leak check. 
e. 	 Propellant tanks assembly leak check. 
f. 	 J-2 engine system leak check. 
g. 	 Engine alignment procedure. 
h. 	 Propulsion system automatic checkout. 
4.2.4.1 Propulsion System Control Console/Stage Compatibility (IB59427 A)
 
On 1 September 1966, this procedure was conducted to verify that actuation
 
of electrical command switches on the propulsion system control console
 
resulted in proper solenoid responses on the stage. The results were 
accepted by Engineering on 21 September 1966, on which date the LOX pre­
valve and LH2 vent valve were installed and tested. 
No revisions or functional failures were noted. 
4.2.4.2 LH, Tank Pressurization System Leak Check (1B59429 A) 
Examination of the fuel tank pressurization system for leakage was
 
accomplished manually between 12 and 20 September 1966.
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Of four leakage entries in the leak check log, two were cleared by re­
placing conoseals, one by replacing a union, and one by retightening a
 
B-nut to the proper torque value.
 
Three revisions to the procedure included two which described measurement
 
of the internal and reverse leakage of check valve, P/N 1B55673-1; and one
 
that deleted a line which was no longer required.
 
There were no functional failures requiring the preparation of failure
 
and rejection reports.
 
4.2.-4.3 Pneumatic Control System Leak Check (1B59430 A)
 
Verification of the leak free condition of all pneumatic system lines,
 
components, and fittings was achieved between 15 and 26 September 1966.
 
Sixteen leakage conditions were noted in the leak check record sheet, 
of which ten were repaired by retightening B-nuts to the proper torque 
value. One Naflex seal, two unions, one adapter, and one bulkhead fitting 
were replaced. A leak in pipe assembly, P/N lB58811-1, at the LH2 pre­
valve, was repaired by installing a Voi-Shan seal, P/N SO-254A4, per FARR 
A216732. 
The revision documentation log sheet contained five revisions. Two per­
tained to adding check valve internal leakage checks; two involved
 
internal leak checks of shutoff valves; and one corrected a minor error
 
in the procedure. 
No other discrepancies were observed.
 
4.2.4.4 Cold Helium System Leak Check (1B59431 A)
 
The leak check and mechanical setup of the cold helium LOX tank pressuri­
zation system was accomplished between 15 and 29 September 1966, with
 
Engineering acceptance taking nlace on 10 October 1966.
 
Of the six" entries in the leak check log sheet, two were corrected by
 
retightening B-nuts to the proper torque value, one by replacing an
 
O-ring and seal, one by replacing a cap, and one by installing a Voa-Shan
 
seal. A leak in manifold assembly, P/N 1A68668-503, at the B-nut to helium
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bottle No. 4, was recapped on PARR A216731. A crush washer was installed,
 
and the nut was tightened to the proper torque value. There were two
 
revisions in the documentation log sheet. One described an internal leak
 
check of check valve, P/N 1B40824-503, and the other corrected a minor
 
error in the procedure.
 
No other defects were found.
 
4.2.4.5 Propellant Tanks System Leak Check (1B59432 NC)
 
Between 30 September and 10 October 1966, the manual leak checks of the
 
propellant tanks assembly, as well as the vacuum checks of the vacuum
 
jacketed ducts and the comnon bulkhead vacuum system, were performed.
 
Of the seven revisions described in the documentation log sheet, one 
changed the document as necessary to account for the use of GHe instead 
of GN2/freon as the pressurant gas. Three revisions pertained to the use
 
of modified pressure adapters; one clarified the procedure; and two 
deleted items because an area was inaccessible, or because they were no 
longer necessary.
 
No leakage conditions were noted in the leak check log, and no other 
defects were discovered.
 
4.2.4.6 J-2 Engine System Leak Check (1B59433 A)
 
The manual leak check of the J-2 engine system, ran and accepted between
 
19 September and 10 October 1966, consisted of two distinct procedures,
 
as follows:
 
a. 	The J-2 engine leak check consisted of tests on the start 
sphere, the control sphere, and the pneumatic lines. 
b. 	 The thrust chamber leak check involved pressurizing the chamber 
and checking its integrity. In this portion of the test, the 
engine part of the LH2 tank pressurization system was leak 
checked. 
Two revisions to the procedure included one changing the document to comply 
with design memo 190 C, and one inserting bleed valve pressure relief 
after engine shutdown.
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The 	only entry in the leak check log, a leak in pipe assembly, P/N
 
1B52566-1, was corrected by the installation of a Voi-Shan seal per
 
FARR A216733. 
4.2.4.7 Engine Alignment (1B39095 A)
 
Performed and accepted on 24 August 1966, the engine alignment procedure
 
contained instructions for measuring and adjusting actuator lengths, and
 
verifying engine alignment while the stage was in a vertical attitude.
 
No revisions or discrepancies were written against this test.
 
4.2.-4.8 Propulsion System Test (IB64390 B) 
The 	five major portions of the propulsion system were tested individually,
 
as follows:
 
a. The LH2 tank pressurization system was functionally checked 
on 27 September 1966. The test was run twice because numerous 
program errors required termination of the first run. These 
errors were corrected through revisions.
 
b. 	The operational evaluation of the pneumatic control system was
 
activated and completed on 27 September 1966, with no problems
 
encountered.
 
c. 	Checkout of the J-2 engine system, performed on 27 and 28 
September 1966, was accomplished after five runs. Early 
runs were terminated because of a GSE problem and various 
program errors, all of which were solved by the final run. 
d. 	The LOX tank pressurization system test was completed on 29
 
September 1966, after two runs. The first run was interrupted

by a GSE power supply failure. No other difficulties were 
observed.
 
e. 	On 29 September 1966, the functional checkout of the pressure

switches was run with no problems occurring.
 
There were a total of thirty revisions to this procedure. They were: 
a. 	 Six deleted items which were no longer required.
b. 	 Four added necessary time delays to complete functions. 
c. 	 Thirteen corrected errors in the procedure and program, one 
clarified the procedure, and one added an item which had
 
been omitted. 
d. The remaining five revisions pertained to a changed calibrated
 
transducer psia; adding a "do not intervene" command; widening 
a tolerance; accounting for operational pressure; and deleting 
a flex hose not required for pressure switch checkout. 
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4.2.5 Hydraulic System Tests
 
The function, cleanliness, and integrity of the hydraulic system components
 
and hardware were verified using the following two procedures:
 
a. Hydraulic system fill, flush, bleed, and fluid samples.
 
b. Hydraulic system automatic checkout.
 
4.2.5.1 Hydraulic System Fill, Flush, Bleed, and Fluid Samples
 
(lB4o973 B). 
Performed between 12 and 30 September and accepted on 13 October 1966, 
this procedure defined the operations required to set up the system for 
automatic checkout. This included checkouts of hydraulic pressure, system 
cleanliness, fluid temperature, and transducers.
 
There were twenty-one revisions appearing in the log sheet, including
 
eleven which changed the procedure because the gimbal control unit had 
been reworked. Five items were deleted because either they were no 
longer required, or parts were short, or the GSE setup had not been com­
pleted. One revision added a new jumper hose, one incorporated new request 
numbers, one changed the order of the procedure, and two revisions were 
voided. 
There were no other discrepancies noted.
 
4.2.5.2 Hydraulic System (IB59485 B)
 
The functional checkout of the hydraulic system, ran on 26 and 27 September, 
and accepted on 30 September 1966, was completed after two runs. The first
 
run was inconclusive due to a GSE malfunction, and program errors. These 
problems were solved prior to the second run. The general test sequence
 
included:
 
a. Accumulator precharge test. 
b. Reservoir oil volume test (unpressurized). 
c. Reservoir oil pressure test (unpressurized).
 
d. Coast mode thermal switch test.
 
e. Mid-stroke lock tolerance check. 
f. System pressure test (pressurized). 
g. Reservoir oil pressure test (pressurized). 
h. Reservoir oil volume test (pressurized).
 
i. Polarity, linearity, and clearance tests. 
j. Transient response test.
 
k. Frequency response test.
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There were eighteen revisions to the procedure noted in the log sheet. 
Five of these corrected program errors, and two deleted steps which
 
were no longer required. The remainder of the revisions pertained to
 
using the Offner recorder; cycle significance of the engine gimbal; cor­
recting the halves balance ratio limit printout; replacing a 20 step with
 
a 30 step; slew rate printout; a part number change; a time delay; an out of
 
service GSE power supply; and rewiring of the EBW pulse sensor.
 
There were no functional failures observed.
 
4.2.6 All Systems Test (1B59609 C)
 
The 	all systems test simulated the situations facing the stage during pre­
launch, launch, powered flight, and coast conditions. On 4 October 1966,
 
those portions of the test which preceded simulated liftoff were run. For
 
these activities, the stage was connected to facility power and air con­
ditioning sources through the umbilical. The umbilicals were removed on 5 
October 1966, for the remainder of the program. Final test results were 
accepted by Engineering on 12 October 1966. 
Forty-eight revisions to the procedure appeared in the revision documentation 
log sheet. Of these, eight corrected errors, five added items which had been 
omitted, and ten deleted steps which were no longer required. The remaining were: 
a. 	One covering a special cable installation.
 
b. 	 One accounting for range safety antenna noise. 
c. 	 One noting that there were seven CW tone switches. 
d. 	Nine inserting time delays as necessary.
 
e. 	Eight correctly setting up test equipment.
 
f. 	One closing the servo control unit so that the VCO could
 
operate.
 
g. 	One widening a tolerance.
 
h. 	Two achieving compatibility with the DDAS closed loop.
 
i. 	One revision written in error was voided.
 
No failure and rejection reports were prepared as a result of the all
 
systems test.
 
4.3 Stage Manufacturing Tests 
All manufacturing and test records for the stage are reviewed and presented 
in this paragraph. Also included are those procedures pertaining to 
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preparation of the stage for shipment to STC. Table II contains narrated 
descriptions of the permanent nonconformances recorded on FARR's during 
manufacturing and test, while those nonconformances discovered during 
final inspection and pre-shipment activities are narrated in Table I, 
Section 3. The dispositioning of these FARR's was accomplished by the 
Material Review Board. A review has been made of acceptance test data per­
taining to the weight, balance, and shipment requirements, hydrostatic proof
 
tests, and subsequent leak check of the propellant tanks. 
4.3.1 Stage Preparation for Shipment
 
Five procedures were conducted to prepare the stage for shipment, by
 
transporter, to Los Alamitos Naval Air Station, and by Super Guppy from 
there to 	Sacramento. These were:
 
a. 	Stage preparation for air transportation.
 
b. 	 Stage transportation, transporter, air carry pallet. 
c. 	Stage loading, air carrier.
 
d. 	 Stage preparation for weigh and balance. 
e. 	 Weigh and balance. 
4.3.1.1 	 Stage Preparation for Air Transportation (1B57355 B) 
The 	support and handling equipment necessary to ship the stage, by Super
 
Guppy, from SSC to STC was installed in the following sequence:
 
a. 	 Installation of the air carry roller transfer kit onto the 
transporter.
 
b. 	Installation of the air carry support assembly (pallet)
 
onto the transporter.
 
c. 	Installation of the stage hoist equipment.
 
d. 	 Loading the stage onto the air carry support assembly/
 
transporter.
 
Performed on 2 December 1966, there was one revision to the procedure
 
deleting the provisions that certain hardware items be shipped along with the 
stage, as it was not necessary to re-install these items at STC. No
 
functional failures were noted. 
4.3.1.2 	 Stage Transportation, Transporter/Air Carry Pallet
 
(1B57356 A)
 
The transportation of the stage, when secured to the air carry pallet/
 
transporter, from Douglas SSC to NAS Los Alamitos, was accomplished as follows:
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a. 	Transporter checkout procedure.
 
b. 	Prime mover to transporter hook-up.
 
c. 	Stage transportation procedure.
 
d. 	Prime mover to transporter disconnect.
 
Performed on 2 December 1966, the ground transportation procedure was
 
completed with no revisions or functional failures. 
4.3.1.3 Stage Loading, Air Carrier (1B57357 C)
 
The 	final operation in the process of preparing the stage for air trans­
portation to STC involved:
 
a. 	Transferring the stage, with its pallet, from the transporter
 
to the cargo lift trailer (CLT).
 
b. 	Positioning the CLT, with the stage, in preparation for
 
loading into the air carrier.
 
c. 	Loading the stage, on its pallet, into the air carrier.
 
d. 	 Removing the ground support equipment. 
e. 	Approval of flight status.
 
The 	loading procedure took place on 2 December 1966, and was modified by
 
five revisions as follows: 
a. 	 One specified that four NAS 1338A5S18 pins instead of two were 
to be used to attach adapters to the roller transfer kit. 
b. 	 One revision noted that only two load binders, rather than 
four, were required to secure the CLT. 
c. 	A revision noted that the aft support ring was replaced by the
 
air carry pallet.
 
d. 	 One revision indicated that tiedowns had been replaced by the 
roller transfer kit.
 
e. 	A final procedure revision added a safety item which had been
 
omitted. 
No functional failures were encountered. 
4.3.1.4 Preparation for Stage Weigh and Balance (1B37831 C) 
The 	stage was prepared for horizontal weighing and balancing operations 
on 28 November 1966, according to the following sequence:­
a. 	Installation of stage handling rings.
 
b. 	Preparation of the weighing area in the VCL.
 
c. 	Installation of stage and handling rings on cradles.
 
d. 	Installation, checkout, and removal (after weighing -operation)
 
of weighing equipment.
 
e. 	Installation of stage support assembly (engine protective
 
cover).
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f. 	Installation of the stage, with rings and cradles, on the
 
transporter.
 
The preparation was completed with no revisions or functional failures
 
reported.
 
4.3.1.5 Weigh and Balance (IB64539 B)
 
The weigh and balance procedure defined the method for measuring the weight 
of the stage in such a manner that the longitudinal center of gravity could 
be determined from the results. The accuracy of these measurements was
 
within ± 0.1 per cent. 
The stage weight in air was found on 29 November 1966, to be 23,749.0 
pounds, and the weight corrected for Standard Locality in a vacuum was 
23,804.7 pounds. The longitudinal center of gravity was found to be located 
at station 335.02. 
There were five revisions to the weigh and balance procedure, including
 
three deleting items which were no longer required. One called for
 
Engineering to determine the configuration status of the stage at weighing
 
time, and one clarified a step.
 
No malfunctions were noted.
 
4.3.2 GN2 - Electrical Preshipment Purge, Air Carry (1B65782 D)
 
The activities required to ready the stage for air shipment to STC were
 
completed on 29 November 1966. These activities included purging and drying
 
the stage to a -30OF dewpoint (235 ppm by volume), and connecting the
 
desiccant breathing assemblies to provide a clean, dry, and safe differential
 
pressure environment during air carry.
 
No revisions to the procedure were included, and there were no functional
 
failures.
 
4.3.3 Final Inspection
 
A final inspection was performed on all mechanical and electrical areas
 
between 7 and 11 November 1966, before the stage was weighed and prepared
 
for shipment. There were 117 discrepancies noted, of which 54 were
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mechanical and 63 were electrical. The mechanical discrepancies were minor
 
deviations including loose or missing parts, bolts too short or too long,
 
parts riding the structure or one another, areas needing cleaning or paint,
 
damaged parts, valves not safetied, and lack of evidence of identification
 
or torque. The electrical problems, also minor, were loose wire harnesses, 
damaged wires, connections improperly served, wires improperly stored, 
cables riding the structure, chaffing, missing, or excess parts. All 
problems were resolved, and rework was completed, with the exception of
 
four discrepancies, as follows: 
a. PARR A216708 noted that pipe assembly, P/N 1B58657-507, was kinked 
1/4 in. behind the B-nut that connected to pipe assembly, P/N 
1B38424-503. The defective pipe assembly was removed and replaced. 
b. 	FARR A216709 reported on a 3/8 in. x 1/4 in. x 0.030 in. ding in
 
the non-propulsive vent duct, P/N 1A87436-501. The defect was
 
accepted for use.
 
c. 	Per FARR A216711,;the cable assembly on transducer 410MT601, P/N 
IB40242-55, S/N 509-18, had torn insulation in two places, 
exposing the shield, The damaged areas were tension spiral 
wrapped with teflon tape per DPS 54010. The rework was acceptable. 
d. 	 FARR A216712 reported on numerous aft skirt stringer caps installed 
in a preloaded condition. All were accepted for use, except the 
cap at stringer 78, which was cracked. It was removed, and 
replaced per B/P. 
4.3.4 Propellant Tank Leak and Hydrostatic Proof Tests
 
The propellant tank hydrostatic proof tests were conducted to discover
 
leakages and stress patterns in a differential pressure environment. The
 
tank assembly was subsequently leak checked using halogen, helium, bubble
 
solution, and dye penetrant methods.
 
4.3.4.1 Propellant Tanks Hydrostatic Proof Test (iB38414A) 
Run on 22 March 1966, the hydrostatic proof checkout of the propellants 
assembly determined its stress patterns, and ensured its structural 
integrity. The test was conducted per acceptance test procedure A659­
1B38414--PATP8, and consisted of the following: 
a. 	 Proof of the common bulkhead to a positive (internal) 
pressure differential of 27.5 + 0.5, -0.0 psi, and the LOX 
tank at the common bulkhead joint to 28.7+ 0.5, -0.0 psi. 
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b. 	 Proof of the common bulkhead to a negative (external) 
pressure differential of -20.6 + 0.0, -0.5 psi, and the LB2 
tank at the common bulkhead joint to 22.5 + 0.5, -0.0 psi. 
c. 	 Proof of the LOX tank to a positive (internal) pressure 
differential of 51.0 + 0.5, -0.0 psi, and the common bulk­
head at the aft dome joint to 19.2 + 0.5, -0.0 psi. 
d. 	 Proof of the LH2 tank to 38.0 + 0.5, -0.0 psi, and the 
common bulkhead to aft dome joint to a positive (internal) 
pressure differential of 5.2 + 0.0, -0.5 psi. 
There were no revisions or functional failures recorded.
 
4.3.4.2 Leak Check
 
The propellant tanks assembly was leak and dye checked, subsequent to 
hydrostatic testing, to ensure the structural integrity of its components 
and welds. Direction and results of these tests were recorded on Quality 
Engineering Charts (QEc), which are included in the Stage Log Book. 
QEC papers 751, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 759, 761, 794, 1520, 1521, 1522, 
1523, 1524, 1537, 1553, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, and 1558 were used for 
the halogen, helium, and bubble solution leak checks. FARR A192991 
noted that the common bulkhead joint could not be pressurized to 46 _ 
2 psi per DPS 40014. After several applications of 1P20057 sealant, 
numerous blind bolt core holes were filled. The dye checks of all tank 
weldswere conducted per QEC's 799, 902, 903, 904, 905, 908, 915, 916, 
917, 920, 921, 924, 935, 968, 986, 1579, 1580, 1684, 1687, 1691, 1693,
 
1694, 1695, 1696, and 1697. Most of these tests revealed No. 1 and 2
 
porosities in several tank welds; however, these indications were accept­
able per dye check inspection. Two failure and rejection reports were
 
written against conditions which could not be immediately corrected. 
They were:
 
a. 	FARR A177071 noted that dye check of the forward dome
 
seams and fitting welds revealed star cracks at fittings 
R-R and C-C, and greater than No. 3 porosity in seam 1. 
All defects were ground out and accepted for use. 
b. 	 FARR A209538 reported that dye penetrant inspection of the 
comqon bulkhead ring weld revealed No. 3 porosity in several 
locations. The porosities were ground out and accepted for 
use. 
65/66 
5.0 POSTRETENTION
 
The information in this section will be added 21 days after the stage is 
shipped from STC.
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FARR NO. 

A188069 

12-8-66 

A208936 

12-6-66 

A218819 

12-8-66 

A218821 

12-10-66 

A218822 

12-12-66 

A219001 

12-7-66 

co 
TABLE I. PERMANENT 	 NONCONFORMANCES AND FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND REJECTION 
REPORTS DURING STAGE SYSTEM CHECKOUTS 
Section 1. Sacramento Test Center Installation and Checkout 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

The reseat pressure 	for fill module, P/N 

lB57781-501, S/N 0019, was measured at 

3125 to 3200 psig during five trials. The 

reseat pressure should have been 3500 psig 

per B/P 1B57781G.
 
On cable assembly, P/N IB49398-509, the 

insulation was pulled back from connector 

P2, exposing the shield. 

After bolting the stage to the dummy aft 

skirt: 

a. 	Two broken taps were found in bolt 

holes, 

b. 	Five broken bolts were found in holes. 

Several potted bus connectors failed the 

megger check specified in B/P 1B57771. The 

problem was discovered during testing per 

H&CO 1B64306. 

Pipe assembly, P/N 1B67143-I,<was 3/4 in. 

too long at the LOX vent valve end, causing 

it to rub against the LOX tank and the 

impingement curtain 	bracket. 
Between forward skirt stringers 38 and 39, 
4 ft. forward of the aft attach ring, there 
was a 1/4 in. by 1/2 in. by 1/8 in. dent 
in the skin. 

DISPOSITION
 
The module was returned to the
 
vendor for rework to speci­
fications. The defective part S/N
 
0019 was replaced by S/N 0017.
 
The cable assembly was scrapped.
 
A new cable assembly was
 
installed.
 
a. The taps were removed, and 
bolts were installed per B/P. 
b. The broken bolts were 
removed and replaced per B/P. 
The 	rework was acceptable.
 
After rework, all connectors
 
except one were accepted for use.
 
Connector, P/N 1A74036-1, was
 
removed and replaced. The re­
work was acceptable.
 
The pipe assembly was scrapped
 
and a new pipe assembly was
 
installed.
 
The damaged area was spotfaced 
3/4 in. in diameter. 7075-T6 
40 gauge clad aluminum filler 
and doubler were fabricated and 
installed per Engineering instruc­
tions. The rework was acceptable. 
00 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A219002 

12-8-66 

A219007 

12-13-66 

A219008 

12-17-66 

A219009 

12-22-66 

A219013 

1-3-67 

A219014 

1-11-67 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Receiving inspection of the stage revealed 

missing and damaged parts, parts not in-

stalled properly, and areas requiring paint
 
touchup.
 
Tube assembly, P/N 1B66837-1, rode hard on 

tube assembly, P/N 1B68838-1. 

Block assembly, P/N 1B64425-1, held tube 

assembly, P/N 1B64380-1, too high to align 

flanges with tube assembly, P/N 1B64384-1. 

With the J-2 engine control bottle pressurized, 

and the helium control solenoid, P/N NAS-27273, 

S/N 342276, energized, there was a pressure 

bleed through the regulator assembly, P/N 

556947, S/N 4080312, that would have depleted
 
bottle pressure in 5 minutes.
 
Gauge, P/N 1B55647-1, 'on hydraulic system air 

tank assembly, P/N 1B55408-503, had broken 

glass. The problem was noted during prefiring
 
surveillance inspection.
 
EH4 firing unit No. 1, P/N 40M39515-119, 

S/N 391, was charged to 4.63 vdc, rather than 

4.2 ± 0.3 vdc per H&CO 1B5951L. Card assembly, 

P/N 1B59981-1, S/N 1210B, located in DP1-BO
 
multiplexer 404A61A201, P/N 1B62513-513, was
 
found to be at fault.
 
DISPOSITION
 
All problems were resolved
 
satisfactorily.
 
The 1B66837-1 was removed and
 
replaced per B/P. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
The block assembly was removed
 
and trimmed as necessary per
 
Engineering instructions. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
The solenoid valves, S/N's
 
342271 and 342276, were replaced
 
by S/N's 328179 and 328187, which
 
were acceptable.
 
The gauge was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
The PC card was removed and
 
replaced. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A219017 
1-19-67 
There was intermittent talkback from 
the LOX and LH2 chilldown shutoff valves, 
P/N's 1A49965-521, S/N 0302, and 1A49965-
519, S/N 0104, respectively. 
A219018 
1-19-67 
There was intermittent talkback from LOX 
chilldown valve, P/N 1A49965-521, S/N 0302, 
during static firing, 
A219019 There was intermittent talkback from LH2 
1-19-67 chilldown valve, P/N 1A49965-519, S/N 
0104, during static firing, 
A219023 Three scratches were found on the forward 

1-26-67 dome as follows: 

a. 	 One 3 in. by 0.001 in., located 3 in. 
left of seam 3 and 49 in. down from 
the tank door. 
b. 	One 5/8 in. by 0.001 in., located
 
2 1/2 in. from the end of the above
 
scratch.
 
c. 	One 1 3/4 in. by 0.001 in. just below
 
the above scratches.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The valves were removed and 
replaced. The rework was 
acceptable. 
The 	 defective valve was returned 
to the vendor for rework to B/P 
and specifications. It was con­
figurated to a -525. However, 
S/N O301was installed on the 
stage. 
The 	 defective valve was returned 
to 	the vendor for rework to B/P
 
and 	specifications. It was con­
figurated to a -523. However,
 
S/N 0509 was installed on the
 
stage.
 
a, 	b, and c. Acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
00 
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TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A219051 

12-13-66 

A219052 

12-13-66 

A219053 

12-13-66 

A219054 

12-13-66 

A219056 
12-14-66 

A219062 

12-17-66 

A219063 

12-19-66 

A219064 

12-19-66 

A219066 

12-19-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Connector 404A61A204, P/N lB57771-509, 

failed megger check per B/P 1B57771. 

Connector 411A99A10-A23, P/N 1B57771-

515, failed megger check per B/P 1B57771. 

Connector 407A4A17, P/N 1B57771-519, 

failed megger check per B/P 1B57771. 

Connector 404A4A17, P/N 1B57771-529, 

failed megger check per B/P 1B57771. 

LH2 chilldown pump, P/N 1A49421-503, 

S/N 143, operated dry for an undeter-

mined period of time.
 
R-3 potentiometer 4llA92A6, P/N 

'lA59358-527,'S/N 012, would not ad-

just per H&CO 1B63373. 

Pressure transducer hIOMT6OO-DO54, P/N 

1B40242-523, S/N 523-19, read 105 psia 

at ambient. 

Pressure transducer 41OMT600-DO54, P/N 

1B40242-523, S/N 523-19, read 105 psia 

at ambient. 

The shells and mounting points on two 

vibration isolators, P/N B22-BC-0.5, 

were damaged beyond use. 

DISPOSITION
 
The defective connector was removed
 
and a new connector was installed.
 
The defective connector was removed
 
and a new connector was installed.
 
The defective connector was removed
 
and a new connector was installed.
 
The defective connector was removed
 
and a new connector was installed.
 
The pump was removed and replaced 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable. 
A mislocated wire was found to be
 
at fault. It was relocated, and
 
the result was acceptable.
 
The transducer was removed and
 
replaced per B/P. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
The transducer was returned to the
 
vendor for rework to specifications.
 
Transducer S/N 523-20, was installed
 
and accepted.
 
The isolators were scrapped. New
 
isolators were installed and
 
accepted.
 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A219067 

12-20-66 

A219068 

12-20-66 

A219069 

12-20-66 

A219070 

12-21-66 

A219071 

12-21-66 

A219072 

12-22-66 

A219073 

12-22-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

There was a 2 inch scratch in the common bulk-

head, 24 in. from the vee and 18 in. from seam 8.
 
On pressure transducer 41OMT614-D0178, P/N 

1B43320-601, s/N 14-1C, the serial number was 

not legible. 

LH2 chilldown pump, P/N IA49421-503, S/N 143, 

was suspected of dry operation for an undeter-

mined period of time. 

The rubber insert on plug 404W208P50, P/N 

S0286E-18-32S, was punctured at pin B. 

LH2 inlet pressure transducer 403MT708-

D104, P/N 1B40242-545, S/N 545-8, had an 

open circuit.
 
Bus connector, P/N 1A74063-1.1, S/N 0248, 

failed megger check. Should have been 

minimum resistance of 5000 megohms showed 

500 megohms. 

Bus connector 404A61A242JI, P/N 1A74063-1.1, 

S/N 00162, failed megger check. B/P 

resistance of 5000 megohms was actually 

40 megohms. 

DISPOSITION
 
Acceptable for use.
 
The serial number was inscribe in the
 
appropriate block. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
The pump was returned to the vendor for
 
rework per Engineering instructions.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
The connector was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
The transducer was removed and replaced.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
The connector was retested per B/P
 
1A74923 D, and was found to be
 
acceptable for use as the defect
 
could not be verified.
 
The connector was retested per B/P
 
1A74923D, and accepted for use, as the
 
B/P requirement was 5 megohms minimum.
 
The unit was rejected in error, as the
 
5000 megohms limit did not apply to this
 
part number.
 
03 
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TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A229702 

12-22-66 

A229703 

12-22-66 

A229706 

12-28-66 

A229707 

12-28-66 

A229712 

12-28-66 

A229713 

12-28-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Forward battery simulator No. 2 had a 

varying output. The range of the output 

was from 2.5 to 5.123 vdc. The required 

output at ambient conditions was 3.5 ±
 
0.5 vdc per H&CO 1B59500.
 
Forward battery simulator No. 2 indicated 

a varying output of 2.5 to 5.123 vdc. The 

required output at ambient conditions was
 
3.5 + 0.5 vdc per H&CO 1B59500.
 
On the J-2 engine, transducer, P/N 703682-31 

measurement D57, had an out-of-tolerance 

high RACS output. 

During performance of the signal condition-

ing system setup, H&CO 1B63149, the adjust-

ment of power supply 404A64A211 was not 

within 5.000 ± 0.005 vdc.
 
Transducer installation per AO 1A81847N-A45 

failed to comply with tensile peel require-

ments per DPS 32330. 

Automatic spark igniter probe, P/N 19-501750, 

in the J-2 engine, was improperly wired. 

DISPOSITION
 
The temperature telemetry module,
 
P/N MA29A-2, was removed and replaced
 
'per B/P, correcting the condition.
 
The simulator was removed and replaced.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
The transducer was removed and replaced
 
following static firing. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
After retest and readjustment.of pots,
 
the power supply was accepted by
 
Engineering for use.
 
The installati6n was removed and
 
replaced per B/P. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
The probe was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARE NO. 

A229714 

12-28-66 

A229717 

12-30-66 

A229722 

1-10-67 

A229724 

1-13-67 

A229802 

1-17-67 

A229803 

1-18-67 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Automatic spark igniter probe, P/N 

19-501750, S/N 725, was improperly 

wired.
 
On pressure switch 403A75S1, P/N 

7851847-535, S/N 105, pins A and B 

were open. They should have been 

closed per H&CO 1B59514D.
 
Output from channel CPlBO-03-03, on 

time division multiplexer 404A61A200, 
P/N 1B62513-515, S/N 00001, was 0 vdc. 
Should have been 1.5 vdc. 

Internal leakage of 50 psi/hour was 

noted in the hydraulic accumulator, 

P/N 1B29319-519, S/N 00023, during
 
static firing.
 
The ambient reading from transducer 

4013MTT18-Cl-401, P/N NA5-27323T3, S/N 

1066, was 1879.1881F, during static 

firing. Output should have been 50 ±
 
0.720F.
 
During static acceptance firing, the 
main oxidizer valve position indicator, 
P/N 405817, S/N 8290075, read less than 
zero (full closed) at engine start, and
 
was intermittent during mainstage burn.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The probe was returned to R/NAA for
 
rework to specifications.
 
The switch was returned to the
 
vendor for rework to specifications,
 
and S/N 106 was installed.
 
Printed circuit card, P/N 1B59981-505,
 
was found to be at fault. The card 
was removed and replaced. The rework 
was acceptable. 
The accumulator was removed and
 
replaced. The rework was acceptable.
 
The transducer was returned to R/NAA
 
for rework to specifications. Another
 
transducer was installed and accepted.
 
The indicator was returned to R/NAA
 
for rework to specifications.
 
,a 
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TABLE I, Section I (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A229804 

1-19-67 

A229806 

1-19-67 

A229807 

1-26-67 

A229808 

1-20-67 

A229810 

1-23-67 

A229811 

1-23-67 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

On submultiplexer card 4OA61A200, P/N 

lB59981-505, pin R had no output with 

power applied from the PUEA. 

On the LOX tank ullage pressure switch, 

at transducer 403MT737, P/N 7851847-533, 

S/N 107, the end with the connector
 
attached was blown off the transducer.
 
The defect was found while testing per
 
H&CO 1B70413.
 
Oxidizer pump discharge pressure trans-

ducer measurement D009, located at 

4O13MTP1, P/N NA5-27412T20T, had out-of­
tolerance high and low RAcS readings.
 
There were parts of two overhead lighting 

fixtures at the forward dome to forward 

skirt junction. Also, broken glass and 

other debris were found between forward 

dome seams 4, 5, and 6. The defects
 
were discovered when inspecting for blast
 
damage from the Beta III test stand.
 
On printed circuit card, P/N 1B59981-1, 

S/N 1210B, pin G had.eutput of 4.62 vdc, 

exceeding the 4.2 ± 0.3 vdc tolerance, 
There were two dents in the LH2 recir-

cilation dudt, P/N 1A49966-501, S/N 012, 

just outside the aft skirt. The dents 

measured 1/4,in. by 1/16 in. and 1/2 in.
 
by 1/8 in.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The unit was retested per B/P 1B59981,
 
and was found to be acceptable for
 
use.
 
The switch was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
The transducer was removed and re­
placed. The rework was acceptable.
 
The debris was cleaned up, and the
 
areas were inspected for further
 
damage. The cleaned up area was
 
accepted for use.
 
The unit was retested per B/P 1B59981,
 
and was found to be acceptable for
 
use.
 
After vacuum readings on the ducts
 
were found to be 50 microns, the part
 
was accepted for use.
 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A229816 

1-26-67 

A229845 

3-28-67 

A229867 

1-31-67 

A229868 

2-1-67 

A229871 

2-3-67 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Sixteen studs, P/N 1B29309-1, holding dis-

connect, P/N 1A48848-505, to the forward 

skirt were loose.
 
The following defects were noted during 

the post-checkout shakedown inspection:
 
a. 	Non-propulsive vent elbow, P/N 

iA87755-501, had a gap at the point 

of the weld.
 
b. 	On the same elbow, there was evidence
 
of corrosion at the stage attach point.
 
Contamination was suspected at flex ducts, 

P/N 1B70852, because: 

a. 	The B-nut connections to adapters, P/N 

1B70624-1, were hand tight only.
 
b. 	Caps, P/N AN9294C, on adapters, P/N
 
1B70624, were not secure.
 
c. 	Threads were galled on the B-nut connec­
tions, and metal particles were present.
 
LH2 directional control vent valve, P/N 

1A49988-l, S/N 0022, had approximately 2 in. 

of gate seal missing. 

Contamination was suspected at the aft umbilical 

quick disconnects and the LOX tank. Contami-

nation was likely in those areas because the dis-

connects were not wrapped properly, and because 

the LOX tank desiccant flex hose was loose at the 

LOX vent valve.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The studs were torqued per B/P 1A39322.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
a. 	Acceptable to Engineering.
 
b. 	The corrosion was removed with a
 
wire brush. The rework was accept­
able.
 
a, b, c. The fittings were disconnected
 
and 	cleaned; then reconnected and
 
tightened per B/P. Tamper seals were
 
added. The rework was acceptable.
 
The valve was removed and replaced, and
 
the new valve was leak checked per B/P
 
1B70018. The rework was acceptable.
 
The areas were cleaned up. The umbili­
cals were then connected, and the flex
 
hose was tightened and tamper seals
 
were installed. The rework was accept­
able.
 
00 
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FARR NO. 

A234713 
2-15-67 

A234714 

2-16-67 

A241901 

2-14-67 

A241903 

2-22-67 

A241906 

2-22-67 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Engine pump purge regulator transducer 
403MT600-D50, P/N 1B43320-511, S/N 19-16, 

read 49.1 psia at ambient.
 
LOX tank pressure control module, P/N 

1B42290-503, S/N 0021, operated at 340 

psia during static firing. It should
 
have operated at 400 t 25 psia.
 
a. A bubbling leak was noted at the B-

nut on the T fitting, P/N 1B64131-l 

at the connection point to tube 
assembly, P/N 1B64135-1. The leak 

remained after the connection was 

torqued to 1400 in. lbs.
 
b. 	A fuzz leak was noted at the B­
nut on tube assembly, P/N 1B58824-1,
 
at the connection,to the fill and
 
drain control module. The connection
 
was retorqued twice.
 
The 	chilldown actuation control module, 

404A43, P/N 1A49982-517, S/N 122, leaked 

past the vent port seat with the valve
 
in the open position.
 
At thrust structure stringer 19, there 

were small dents in four shock mount iso­
lators, P/N B21-BC-O.5. 
DISPOSITION
 
The 	 transducer was removed and re­
placed. The rework was acceptable.
 
The module was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
a. 	Crush washer, P/N MC 185C16A was
 
installed.
 
b. 	Crush washer, P/N MC 185C4A was 
installed. 
The 	rework was acceptable.
 
The valve was removed and replaced
 
per B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
TABLE I, Section 	1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A241910 	 The high output pressure hose would not 

2-24-67 	 hook up properly to the accumulator GN2 

fill valve, P/N 1B31295-1, S/N 80,
 
because the threaded area of the fill
 
valve inlet was too short.
 
A241916 a. The LOX vent and relief valve, P/N 
3-1-67 1A48312-503, S/N 0024, leaked at 
the combined rate of 55 scim. 
b. 	Engine pump purge control module, 
P/N 1A58347-505, S/N 030, leaked 
at 0.3 scim. 
c. 	LOX tank relief valve, P/N IA49590­
513, S/N 518, leaked at 66.5 scim. 
d. 	Cold helium sphere, P/N 1A48858-1,
 
S/N 	1094, had a fuzz leak past the 
gasket at the sphere mounting inter­
face.
 
A241920 There was a flat spot at the 900 bend, 

3-1-67 4 in. from the end of tube assembly, P/N 

1B67277-1. 

A241923 There was excessive hydraulic fluid 

3-20-67 leakage at the shaft seal on hydraulic 

pitch actuator 403A71, P/N 1A66248-Ol1A, 
S/N 47. 
DISPOSITION
 
The fill valve was removed and re­
placed. The rework was acceptable.
 
a. The valve was replaced by a -505 
configuration part. 
b. Acceptable to Engineering for use. 
c. 	The valve was replaced with 
a -515 configuration part per WRO 
3314. 
d. 	All clamp bolts were checked for
 
torque. The rework was acceptable.
 
The tube assembly was scrapped. A
 
new tube assembly was installed and
 
accepted.
 
The area was cleaned. After leak 
checks and other tests were performed 
per Engineering instructions and H&CO 
1B41004A, the actuator was accepted 
for use. 
I , 
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FARR NO. 

A241924 

3-21-67 

A241925 

3-21-67 

A245490 

5-16-67 

A245511 

3-9-67 

A245513 

3-20-67 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

On wire assembly 411A99AlOWl, P/N 

1B54269-l, S/N 00004, wire P119H20 was 

burned and damaged. Bare wire was, 

exposed, and there was evidence that 

the wire had shorted to the structure. 

The threads,were stripped on standoff 

404A2, P/N 1B31244-531, with the result 

that cables, P/N's 1B59468-1, 1B33327-1,
 
and 1B59467-1, could not be secured to
 
it with clamps.
 
Receptacle 404W15J1 on the aft umbilical 

had a broken key.
 
The digital events recorder fuel ddple-

toz. sensor 1 wet cycled for 26 minutes 

after thefirst liquid indication, 

a. 	Wire 411WP5 and 41OAIJ8 numbers Q9100 

and Q9101, had two pieces of teflon
 
tubing incorrectly installed and loose. 

b. 	There were several points of damaged 

insulation, exposing the shield, on
 
cable 410MT601, P/N 1B40242-55.
 
c. 	The insulation was damaged, &xposing
 
the shield, below the lower left hand
 
corner of support panel on cable
 
410MT600, P/N 1q49242-67.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The'wir&-was removed,and replaced.'
 
Damaged adjabent wires were wrapped
 
with teflon tape per DPS 54010. Thd
 
wire bundle was reclamped. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
The standoff was repaired per B/P
 
1B53312. The rework was acceptable.
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The 	condition was temporarily accept­
able, but was to be resubmitted after
 
the 	next fuel loading operation.
 
a. 	Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
b. and c. The defective cables were
 
removed and replaced. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
TABLE I, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A245515 
3-21-67 
During the all systems test, H&CO 1B65533, 
measurement M069 exhibited 3 per cent 
noise fluctuations when the LOX and LH2 
chilldown inverters were in operation. 
The maximum allowable fluctuation due to 
EMI was 3 per cent. 
A251479 
5-12-67 
Cable assembly, P/N 1B53574-501, going 
to transducer 403MT750C-D218, had broken 
insulation, exposing the shield, 1.5 
feet from the transducer end. 
A251517 
5-18-67 
Part of the key broke off receptacle 
404W15J1, in addition to that reported on 
FARR A245490. The additional broken piece 
measured 3/16 in. in length. 
A261730 
11-8-67 
During the propulsion leak checks, the LOX 
propulsion valve, P/N 1B59010-503, S/N 117, 
leaked at the closing port adapter weld. 
DISPOSITION 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The broken insulation was repaired 
with teflon tape per DPS 54010. The 
rework was acceptable. 
The edges of the broken key were
 
deburred and was accepted for use.
 
The adapter, P/N DEL-10361MC, was
 
removed and replaced, and the valve
 
assembly releak checked during appli­
cable 1B71909 procedures.
 
TABLE I (Continued)
 
Section 2. Space Systems Center, Vehicle Checkout Laboratory
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A216726 The rubber insert was damaged between pins G and H in 
8-19-66 plug A62W200-P16 of wire harness, P/N 1B58192-1, S/N 
00o04. 
A216727 There was a damaged rubber insert at pin B, plug P29, 
8-19-66 P/N SO-286E12-1OS, on wire 404W7 of wire harness, 
P/N 1B58196-1. 
A216728 There was no continuity between pins B and E of plug 
8-31-66 P45, wire 404W208, on LOX tank probe, P/N lB41769-4Ol. 
A216729 There was no continuity between pins 2 and 3 on plug
8-31-66 A. wire harness 403A200, P/N 1B58136. 
A216730 Remote analog submultiplexer, P/N 1B54062-503, 

9-20-66 S/N 018, failed intermittently to sync during DDAS 
testing. 

A216731 There was a leak in manifold assembly, P/N 1A68668-
9-22-66 503, at the B-nut to cold helium bottle No. 4 
in the main tunnel. 
A216732 The LHO prevalve leaked at the B-nut of pipe 
9-26-66 assembly, P/N 1B58811-1. 
DISPOSITION
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use. 
The probe was removed and replaced.
 
The plug was disassembled, and no 
malfunction was found. The plug 
was reassembled and continuity was 
established.
 
The unit was retested per B/P
 
1B54063, and was found acceptable 
for use.
 
A crush washer was installed and
 
the B-nut was retorqued. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
A Voi-Shan seal, P/N S0254A4, was
 
installed. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
TABLE I, Section 2 (Continued) 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS DISPOSITION 
A216733 
9-27-66 
There was a leak at the B-nut flare on pipe assembly, 
P/N 1B52566-1, at the customher connect panel. 
A crush washer was installed per 
DPS 10002. The rework was 
acceptable. 
A216734 
9-28-66 
Transducer, 
mittent. 
P/N IB40242-533, S/N 533-12, was inter- After retest failed to reproduce 
the defect, the unit was accepted 
for use. 
kn 
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Section 3. Assembly and Systems Installation 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 	 DISPOSITION 
A159320 Inspection showed that at forward skirt stringer 61, MC124D6 coupling nuts acceptable
 
9-4-66 	 30 in. aft of the forward face, pipe assembly, to Engineering.
 
P/N IB58657-517C, had two MC124D6 coupling nuts
 
installed. Coupling nuts should be S0864-6 per
 
B/P 1B54657.
 
A196257 In thermoconditioning panel, P/N 1A98145-515, The excess nut plate was removed, 
6-16-66 S/N 2008, one hole was mislocated, an excess hole and all holes were plugged. The panel 
was drilled, and three B/P holes were omitted. was completed per B/P. 
A203681 On the aft skirt: a. The excess hole was plugged
7-15-66 
- double flush with MS 20427M3 
a. Duct assembly, P/N iA78053-1, had one excess 	 rivet material, and the oversize
 
No. 40 hole in the mounting bracket, and six holes were accepted for use.
 
0.190/0.195 in. holes which were oversize
 
from 0.200 to 0.260 in. b. The mislocated hole was plugged
 
double flush with AD3 rivet
 
b. A No. 40 hole in the bracket which was called 	 material. The bracket was
 
out per B/P was misaligned with the excess hole. trimmed to allow installation
 
of B/P attachments. All rework
 
was acceptable.
 
A203764 Per QEC 728, gap "E" datum pl&ne had out-of-tolerance Acceptable toEngi'neerinj for use.
 
7-19-66 gaps at eleven locations.
 
A203767 Between thrust structure stringers 18 and 25A, twelve Bolts, P/N 10264-9A,nuts, P/N

7-21-66 extra holes were drilled through the LOX tank 	attach NSl0288-048, and washers, P/N 
angles.... 	 S0148A050-026, were-installed in
 
the excess holes. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
TABLE I, Section 3 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A216703 

9-1-66 
A216708 
11-7-66 
A216709 

11-9-66 

A216711 

11-14-66 

A216712 

11-14-66 

A216713 

11-30-66 

A216826 

7-26-66 

A216828 

7-26-66 

LO 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

On wire harness 404W208, P/N IB58131-1, the insulation 
was damaged on shielded twisted pairs D1673A22 and 
D1674A22, and D1184A22 and D11S2A22. 
Pipe assembly, P/N 1B58657-507, was kinked 1/4 in. 
behind the B-nut that connected to pipe assembly, 
P/N 1B38424-503. 
There was a 3/8 in. x 1/4 in. x 0.030 in. ding in 
non-propulsive vent duct, P/N 1A87436-501. 
Cable assembly on transducer 41oMT601, P/N 1B40242-55, 

S/N 509-18, had the insulation torn in two places, 

exposing the shield, 

a. At the forward end of the aft skirt, numerous 
stringer caps, P/N 1B42355, were installed in 
a preloaded condition. 
b. An extreme preloaded condition at stringer 78 
caused the cap to crack. 
The elastometer was debonded from the frame of 

vibration isolator, P/N 90582-1. 

The phenolic base was broken on the Al grommet on 

wire harness 403W33, P/N IB57017-1.
 
At aft skirt stringers 93 and 94, station 280, the 

shell of receptacle 404A41-J2 on HiA
2 chilldown 
pump, P/N IA49421-503, had a flat spot adjacent 
to pin 4. 
DISPOSITION
 
The 	damaged wires were repaired
 
with teflon tape per DPS 1.357-15. 
The rework was acceptable. 
The kinked pipe assembly was 
removed and replaced per B/P. The 
rework was acceptable. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use. 
The 	damaged areas were tension
 
spiral wrapped with teflon tape
 
per DPS 54010. The rework was
 
acceptable.
 
a. 	Acceptable to Engineering for
 
for use.
 
4' 
b. 	The cap at stringer 78
 
was removed and replaced. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
The isolator was removed and
 
replaced. The rework was acceptable.
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The 	receptacle was reformed to the
 
desired contour. The rework was
 
acceptable.
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FARR NO. 

A216830 

7-27-66 
A216833 

7-29-66 

A217001 
8-9-66 

A217011 
8-18-66 
A217013 
3-19-66 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

a. Per QEC 960, the surface of panel, P/N 1B38125-501, 
was 0.070 in. out of parallel. 
was 0.040 in. out of parallel. 
Maximum allowable 
b. On the same panel, the location of the attachment 
holes was 0.120 in. from perpendicular. Maximum 
allowable was 0.100 in. per QEC 960. 
Narmco adhesive residue was found inside the LH2 
chilldown return elbow at aft skirt stringers 6 and 

7, station 235. 

Tap fittings, P/N's 1B29959-1 and 1B29958-1, were 
mislocated 4 1/2 in. to 6 in. to the right of the 
aft dome weld seam adjacent to aft skirt stringer 
26, station 240. 
Four holes were mislocated 1/8 in. through segments, 
P/N's 1B65395-513 and -1, and LOX tank to structure 
attach angle, P/N 1B64563-511. Because of this, it 
was impossible to maihtain proper edge distance on 
the installation of retainer, P/N 1B54098-567. 
Four holes were mislocated 1/ 8 .in. through segments, 
P/N's 2B65395-505 and -507, and LOX tank to thrust 
structure attach angle, P/N 1B64563-507. Because 

of this, proper edge distance could not be maintained 
when retainer, -P/N1B54098-575, was installed, 
DISPOSITION
 
a. 	Tapered shims were fabricated
 
and installed between the panel
 
and angles, PIN's 1B37637-5, -13,
 
-17, and -21.
 
b. 	The panel was removed and rotated
 
clockwise to B/P requirements.
 
Both reworks corrected the problems
 
satisfactorily.
 
The adhesive was removed with a 
plastic scraper and methylene chloride. 
The rework was acceptable. 
Pipe assembly, P/N 1B52526-1, which
 
could not be installed due to the
 
mislocated fittings, was redeveloped
 
and 	installed per Engineering inst­
ructions. The rework was acceptable.
 
The 	retainer was cut where edge
 
distance. could not be maintained. 
It was then installed per Engineering
 
instructions, and accepted for use.
 
The 	retainer was cut at the end where 
the 	edge distance was short. It was 
then installed, picking up B/P
 
attachments. The rework was
 
acceptable. 
TABLE I, Section 3 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A217024 Retainer, P/N 1B54098-543, for the installation 

8-24-66 of the impingement curtain on the thrust struc-

ture at stringers 21A and 22A, was too short, 

As a consequence, retainer, P/N 1B54098-545, 

was rotated counterclockwise, creating a 2 3/4
 
in. gap between the -545 and -501 retainers.
 
A217192 
9-20-66 
a. Duct assembly, P/N 1A49320-501-OO1, S/N 32, 
had numerous scratches and dings in the 
outer wall, ranging from 0.001 in. to 0.005 
in. in depth. 
b. Vacuum check per B/P A659-1A39322-1-PATP3CRT4 
was not accomplished prior to installation. 
A220116 There were excess holes noted in piping boots, 

8-18-66 P/N's 1B44621-503 and -505. 

DISPOSITION
 
Retainer, P/N 1B54098-545, was
 
removed and replaced with a -501
 
which was trimmed to fit. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
a and b. Acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
Patches were cut from boot material
 
and bonded to the outside of the
 
boots in the puncture areas. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
tM 
TABLE II. FAILURE AND REJECTION REPORTS, STRUCTURAL ASSD4BLIES
 
Section 1. Propellant Tank Assembly, P/N 1A39303-519
 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A168956 There were mislocated "H" holes in doublers -33 

10-20-65 and -35. Edge distance was 5/32 in., should 

have been 23/32 in. 

A177071 	 Dye check of forward dome seam and fitting 

4-3-66 	 welds revealed. 

a. Star cracks in fitting R-R, segment 4. 
b. Star cracks in fitting C-C, segment 2.
 
a. Greater than No. 3 porosity in seam 1.
 
A177075 Inspection of the propellant tanks revealed 

5-6-66 that segments 3, 5, and 7 did not meet tensile 

bond requirements specified in DPS 23003. 

A188707 	 Dye check of the aft dome ring weld revealed 

3-5-66 	 transverse cracks, No. 3 porosity, transverse 

linear connected porosity, and dye indications, 

except between meridian seams 5 and 6, 6 and
 
7, and 8 and 9.
 
A188724 Dye check of the forward dome to ring out-

3-14-66 side weld revealed a greater than No. 3 

porosity in the areas of segment 1 and segment
 
2, and linear connected porosity throughout
 
the weld.
 
DISPOSITION
 
Doublers were removed and replaced with
 
blank doublers. Holes were located
 
per existing holes in stage.
 
Rework acceptable to Engineering.
 
All defects were ground out and
 
accepted for 	use.
 
Test of specimens was acceptable to
 
Engineering. Segments were reworked
 
to replace the liner in those areas per
 
Engineering instructions. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
Defects were ground out, smoothed, and
 
blended to a 10:1 ratio. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
Defects were acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
TABLE II, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A192821 

3-12-66 

A192825 

3-16-66 

A192982 

3-13-66 

A192987 

3-20-66 

A192991 

3-24-66 

A193469 

4-3-66 

A193472 

4-12-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

a. 	The forward end of the cylindrical ring was 

draw filed to remove mill marks without 

Engineering authorization.
 
b. 	The position 2 prick punch on the cylindrical
 
ring was misaligned 3/32 in.
 
There was a 0.020 in. gap between doubler, P/N 

lB59281-27, and the skin at aft dome seam 5.
 
Forward dome attach angles at seams 3, 5, 6, 

and 8 had damaged areas, double drilled holes, 

and skin wrinkles, 

The primed surface surrounding the LOX door 

jamb was discolored.
 
The common bulkhead joint could not be pressur-
ized to 46 ± 2 psi per DPS 40014. The leakage 
was detected at the open blind bolt core holes. 
There was a 38 in. x 21 in. x 1 3/8 in. 

canned area in forward dome segment 3, 3 1/2 

in. forward of the interface ring. 

While curing the adhesive bonding supports, 

P/N's 1B31138-l, 1B37414-1, 1B37888-529 and 

-521, 1B37889-531, and 1B37899-1 and -501, in
 
the main tunnel area, vacuum was lost for 30
 
seconds.
 
DISPOSITION
 
a and b. Acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The damaged areas were blended and
 
polished. All others were accepted
 
for 	use.
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The holes were filled with 1P20057
 
sealant. After several applications,
 
the rework was accepted for use.
 
The fixture ring was shimmed to re­
lieve existing preload, and the out­
of-contour condition was accepted by
 
Engineering for use.
 
All supports were removed and replaced
 
per B/P.
 
C) 
TABLE II, Section 1 (Continued) 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A193473 	 On the exterior of the LH2 tank, supports,

4-15-66 	 P/N's IB31140-1, and 1B37899-1 and -501, were 
bonded onto unprimed skin. 

A193474 	 On the exterior of forward dome seam 3, nine 

4-15-66 	 supports were bonded to unprimed skin. 
A197726 On the exterior of aft dome seam 7, 120 in. 
4-15-66 outboard from the center, support, P/N 
1B37889-529, had an adhesive plugged insert, 
A197727 	 On the exterior surface of the main tunnel, 

4-15-66 	 at station 328, support, P/N iB37889-531, 
was partially bonded onto an unprimed surface. 
A197730 On the aft dome, 6 in. forward of the thrust 
4-19-66 structure attach angle, support, P/N 1B37762-1, 
was unboned. 
A197744 Along the exterior of forward dome weld seam 
6-7-66 3, 85 in. to 120 in. outboard from the center 
hole, twelve nylafil supports were bonded to 

an unprimed surface. 

A198126 	 At the aft and forward circumferential balsa 
5-12-66 	 weld seams, in the glass liner, temperature
and vacuum recordings were not taken for 
2 1/2 hours, and those temperatures recorded 
during the 24-hour cure were excessively 
high per DPS 	23003.
 
DISPOSITION 
Support, P/N 	1B31140-1, was removed per

DPS 32330 and replaced per B/P. The 
others were accepted for use.
 
Acceptable to Engineering tor use.
 
The support was removed per DPS 32330 
and replaced per B/P. The rework was 
acceptable. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The support was removed and replaced 
with a new part per B/P. The rework 
was acceptable. 
One support, P/N 1B57158-3, was accept­
able for use. All others were removed 
per DPS 32330 and replaced per B/P.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
After reviewing tensile test results, 
Engineering accepted the situation for 
use. 
TABLE II, Section 1 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A198128 

5-17-66 

A203703 

7-13-66 

A209538 

3-30-66 

A209939 

6-13-66 

A209941 

6-13-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Aft dome segment 9 glass liner adhesive bond 

did not meet the tensile strength requirements
 
of DPS 32003. The required bond strength to
 
withstand an average pull of 150 psi was not
 
met since on the average the bonds were
 
broken at 64 psi.
 
a. There were scratches in five helium bottles 
in the LH2 tank. 
b. There were scratches and a ding in the 
forward face segment 3 skin. 
Dye penetrant inspection of the common bulkhead 

ring weld revealed No. 3 porosity in several 

locations throughout the weld.
 
On the LOX vent line installation, two strut 

assemblies, P/N 1A57514-511, were damaged at 

the lower end. The damaged flat area of the 

left strut had been filed without
 
authorization.
 
The oxidizer vent duct, P/N 2A69044-1, S/N 

021, was dinged in three locations. 

DISPOSITION
 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
a and b. Acceptable to Engineering for
 
use.
 
The porosities were ground out and
 
accepted.
 
The damaged areas were blended with No.
 
400 paper and brushed with alodine.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
The duct was removed and replaced per
 
B/F.
 
CA 
-J 
TABLE II 

FARR NO. 
A182636 

1-19-66 

A182649 

1-23-66 

A182650 

1-23-66 

A182660 

1-22-66 

A182662 

1-25-66 

A182667 

1-29-66 

A187003 

1-24-66 

(Continued)
 
Section 2. Forward Dome Assembly, P/N 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
Inspection revealed an underfill condition in 

the flange to dome weld midway between seams 

3 and 4. 

Inspection of segment 4 revealed two undersize 

areas in the fillet weld around the 12 

pressure fitting. Total defective area was
 
2 in.
 
Inspection of segment 8 revealed cuts and 

scratches on the exterior surface surrounding 

the AE-AE fitting, 

X-ray 66-B12 of segment, S/N 00144, revealed 

incomplete weld penetration at the weld root, 

void, underfill, and cold shot (transverse) 

in the AE-AE chip to segment weld.
 
X-ray 66-B12 of segment, S/N 00156, revealed 
suckback in the AH-AH flange to dome outside 

weld. 

Dye check of segment, S/N 00143, revealed a 

crater crack in the outside weld of the FF 

fitting.
 
Inspection of the segment 2 to AC-AC fitting weld 

revealed: 

a. 	Entire circumference of weld had lack of 

fusion, holes, and irregular bead. 

IA39304-509 
DISPOSITION 
Defect was ground out, smoothed and
 
blended. Rework was acceptable to 
Engineering for use.
 
Defective area was ground out and
 
rewelded. The rework was acceptable.
 
Defects were blended out and touched up
 
with alodine per DPS 9.45. Rework
 
acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
Defects were minor in nature and there­
fore were acceptable to Engineering for
 
use.
 
Suckback was smoothed and blended. Re­
work was acceptable to Engineering for 
use. 
Defect removed by grindout and blend.
 
Rework acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
a. 	Defective weld was ground out and
 
auto-rewelded.
 
b. 	Defects were chipped and ground out,
 
and auto-rewelded locally.
 
TABLE I, Section 2 (Continued) 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS DISPOSITION 
A1B7003 
(Cont.) 
b. 
a. 
X-ray 66-B12 revealed a cavity in view 1, 
a void in view 2, and connected porosity 
in view 4. 
Grindout to setup line. 
a. 
d. 
Circumference of the weld was ground 
out to the set up line and rewelded. 
Canned areas were heated and re­
contoured. 
d. 
e. 
Canned condition two places in the segment. 
X-ray and dye check showed cracks at edge 
of weld. 
e. Cracks were ground out and blended,
and segment was subjected to eddy 
current test. Rework acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
A187023 
1-31-66 
X-ray 66-BIP and dye check of the meridian 
welds revealed: 
a. Seams 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, had fine 
scattered porosity, clusters and connected 
porosity, scattered porosity, linear poro­
sity, inclusions, and underfill. 
b. Seam 2 also had a mismatch and a canned 
condition. 
a. Seams 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 required 
one reweld each before grindouts
and blends were acceptable to 
Engineering. Seam 4 did not require 
a reweld. 
b. Mismatch and canned condition of 
seam 2 were alleviated during re­
weld. Rework acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
A189317 
2-11-66 
Inspection of the forward dome with a pi tape 
revealed that the equatorial plane was 0.015 
in. out of tolerance. 
The out-of-tolerance condition was 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
A189332 
2-16-66 
Inspection of the forward dome flange weld 
revealed: 
a, A canned condition in segment 3 adjacent 
to flange weld area. 
b. A grindout in meridian seam 8 at the junction 
of the flange weld caused underfill. 
a. Canned area was heated and recon­
toured, eddy current checked, 
X-rayed, and dye checked. Rework 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
b. Underfill was ground, smoothed, and 
blended to a 10:1 ratio. Rework 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
0 
C, 
C) 
TABLE II, Section 2 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 	 DISPOSITION 
A189332 c. Scraper marks in flush areas of meridian a. Scraper marks were smoothed out.
 
(Cont.) welds adjacent to the inside flange weld. Rework acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
A189335 Dye check of the inside forward dome flange a. Weld overlap was scraped flush. 
2-17-66 weld revealed: The rework was acceptable to 
Engineering for use.
 
a. 	 Weld overlap between seams 4 and 5. 
b. 	Porosity was ground out, smoothed,
 
b. 	No. 3 porosity between seams 6 and 7, 8 and and blended to a 10:1 ratio. The 
9, 	 and 9 and 1. rework was acceptable to Engineering 
for use. 
A189344 Inspection of forward dome segment 7 revealed: a and b. The bracket was removed and 
2-23-66 	 segment 7 was reworked per SEO's 
a. 	Two cracks in the outside surface, opposite 1A39304-013 and IA393O4-ol4. The 
bracket, P/N 1B42297-1, on inside surface- rework was acceptable. 
of the segment. 
b. 	High area on outside surface, opposite
 
bracket, P/N IB42297-1.
 
A189359 Inspection of the planes and radii of the The out-of-tolerance condition was
 
3-1-66 forward dome revealed that the contour was acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
out-of-tolerance at latitudes 600 and 820,
 
and the AH-AH pressure sensor fitting.
 
TABLE II (Continued)
 
Section 3. Cylindrical Tank Assembly, P/N 1A39306-505
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A171525 
10-30-65 
X-ray 65-B1310W showed a linear porosity and 
a misplaced setup line in the outside weld of 
the bottle fittings on cylindrical tank seg­
ment, P/N 1A39306-405, S/N 13. 
A171527 
11-1-65 
A dye check of the outside welds of the helium 
bottle fittings on cylindrical tank segment, P/N 
1A39306-405, S/N 17, showed a crater crack at fit-
ting 4, and a lack of fusion at fitting 2. 
A171538 
11-3-65 
A dye check of the support fitting welds on 
cylindrical tank segment, P/N 1A39306-405, S/N 
14, showed No. 3 porosities and weld overlaps 
at fittings 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
A171594 
12-7-65 
X-ray 65-B155BM showed voids, scattered and 
linear porosities, and lack of fusion in the 
ring seam welds of the cylindrical tank aft 
ring, P/N 1B39306-23, S/N 8. Following reweld- 
ing operations, X-ray 65-B155R1 showed lack of 
fusion and porosities, and X-ray 65-B155R2 showed 
inclusions. 
A171992 
11-4-65 
Inspection of segment, S/N 00013, revealed that 
the No. 4 fitting was 0,012 in. out of round. 
Maximum allowable ovality was 0.010 in. 
A172135 
11-11-65 
Cylindrical tank segment, P/N 1A39306-405, S/N 
112, had several gouges, 0.002 in. to 0.030 in. 
deep, in the forward eight clevis weld pads. 
A176994 
1-3-66 
Visual inspection and dye check revealed porosity 
greater than No. 3 in longitudinal seam 6 inside 
weld. 
-D 
0j 
DISPOSITION
 
The noted conditions were acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
The defective areas were scraped and
 
ground out, smoothed, etched, and dye
 
checked. The rework was acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
The defective areas were ground out to
 
an acceptable condition.
 
The defects were ground out and re­
welded. After three rewelding opera­
tions, X-ray 65-B155R3 was acceptable.
 
The rework was acceptable to Engineer­
ing for use.
 
Out-of-tolerance ovality of the No. 4
 
fitting did not impair usage; therefore
 
Engineering accepted the part for use.
 
The edges of the gouges were smoothed
 
without increasing the depth. The
 
rework was acceptable for use.
 
Defects were ground out, and the grindout
 
was smoothed and blended to a 10:1 ratio.
 
The rework was acceptable to Engineering.
 
0 
CJ 
TABLE II, Section 3 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 

A176996 

1-3-66 

A177032 

1-9-66 

A177034 

1-10-66 

A177035 

1-10-66 

A177861 

12-18-65 

A184691 

2-2-66 

A184692 

2-3-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A dye check and visual inspection of the cylin-

drical tank assembly, P/N IA39306-505, S/N 2008, 

showed No. 3 porosity at two places in the out- 

side weld of seam 5, after the areas were ground 

below the parent material, 

A visual inspection per DPS 14052 showed that 

the outer side of cylindrical tank segment 1, P/N 

1A39306-27, S/N 19, had intermittent scratches 

adjacent to weld seam 1, along the entire length 

of the seam. The scratches ranged from flush to
 
0.002 in. deep.
 
X-ray 66-50 showed a void with a tail in 

cylinder seam 2. 

X-ray 66-50 and dye check revealed No. 3 poro-

sity condition in seam 7 inside weld. 

X-ray 65-B162BM showed a crack in seam 3 of 

the cylindrical tank forward ring, P/N 1A39306-

35, S/N 8. 

The inside weld was ground below the parent 

material out of B/P tolerance. 

The grindout to remove linear dye check indi-

cations went below the parent material on the 

inside ring to tank weld. 

DISPOSITION
 
X-ray 65-50 showed that seam 5 was
 
acceptable. The defective areas were
 
blended out to a 10:1 ratio, finished
 
to a maximum 63 rms surface, and dye
 
checked. The rework was acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
The scratches were blended to a 10:1
 
ratio to the existing depth, and smoothed
 
to a 63 rms surface finish. The rework
 
was acceptable for use.
 
Defect was ground out, smoothed, and
 
blended to a 10:1 ratio. Rework accept­
able to Engineering for use.
 
Defects were ground out, smoothed, and
 
blended to a 10:1 ratio. Rework
 
acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The crack was ground out and dye
 
checked. The rework was acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
Excessive grindout was acceptable to
 
Engineering for use after blending.
 
Grindouts were blended per DPS 15101.
 
Rework was acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
TABLE II, Section 3 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

Al8693 Angularity inspection revealed that an out-

2-3-66 of-tolerance condition existed at forward 

ring seam 1 and aft ring seams 3, 5, 6, and 7.
 
A188497 The centroid of the tank exceeded B/P tol-

2-26-66 erance. 

A188499 Inspection of the cylindrical tank revealed 

3-1-66 that the 0.040 in. x 450 chamfered surface 

of the ring angle was draw filed during weld 

preparation. DPS did not authorize this 

work.
 
DISPOSITION
 
The out-of-tolerance conditions were
 
acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The tank was shimmed to align the cen­
troid within B/P tolerance. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
Draw filing of the chamfer was
 
acceptable to Engineering. The DPS
 
was rewritten to reflect updated method
 
of preparation.
 
0D
 
-TABLE II (Continued)
 
Section 4. LOX Tank Assembly, P/N 1A39307-507
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS DISPOSITION 
A169209 
10-26-65 
Inspection of baffle, P/N 1A39267-401, at the 
forward end of cone and circumferential panels, 
3 5/8 in. from f~rward edge, showed evidence 
of electric arc burns on inside anodized 
surfaces. Burns were 5/32 in. to 5/16 in. in 
length and irregularly spaced. 
Burned condition was blended out with 
No. 400 sandpaper and touched up with 
anodine 1200 per DPS 41410 and NIL-C­
5541. Rework acceptable to Engineering. 
A177831 
12-15-65 
Visual inspection revealed indentations and 
depressions in the inside surface of the 
standing leg and the base leg of the common 
bulkhead ring between seams 3 and 4. 
Defects were scraped, smoothed and 
blended in with surrounding surface. 
Rework acceptable to Engineering for 
use. 
A182613 
1-12-66 
The flatness tolerance of 0.030 in. at the 
forward trim line of the aft dome was not 
Defect acceptable to Engineering. 
held in relation to the check points on 
the A652-1A39309-1WF3 LOX welder, after 
centering the Jamb per gap M1 of QEC 647A. 
A182618 
1-14-66 
The 1/4 in. lockbolt holes in segments 7 
and 8 were located 5/8 in. and 1 5/8 in., 
respectively, from the centerline of seam 7. 
The holes should have been located 1 1/8 in. 
from the seam centerline per B/P 1A39307. 
Defect acceptable to Engineering for use. 
A182621 
1-14-66 
There was 
face weld 
a 1 in. lack of fusion in the aft 
from seam 8 toward seam 7. 
Defect was 
The rework 
ground out and auto-rewelded. 
was acceptable. 
A182622 
1-15-66 
During the initial pass of the forward side 
of the common bulkhead to aft dome weld the 
welder stopped after one foot of travel, 
Weld was chipped out 2 in. 
termination and rewelded. 
was acceptable. 
back of weld 
The rework 
TABLE II, 
FARR NO. 
A182627 

1-17-66 

A182630 

1-18-66 

A182639 

1-20-66 
A182647 
1-22-66 
A188496 

2-24-66 

A188669 

2-24-66 

Section 4 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A mismatch existed between thrust structure 

attach angles at the heel line. 

Inspection of the bulkhead installation 

revealed that several hi-lock holes were 

elongated. 

Gussets, P/N's 2331289-43 and -44, and 
strut, P/N IB32892-1, used for the attach-
ment of strut tube, P/N 1B32892-401, were 
mislocated 3 in. on the baffle assembly, 
P/N 1A39267. 
Helium leak test revealed that several 
lockbolts leaked in excess of 1 x 10 "6 
seim. 

During stud removal per B/P 1B59281, studs 

broke 0.015 in. below parent metal surface, 

X-ray 66-50 and dye check of the LOX tank 
meridian welds revealed a void and larger 
than No. 3 porosity in the inside weld, 
between seem 9 and seam 1. 
DISPOSITION 
Mismatch acceptable to Engineering for
 
use.
 
Defective holes were reamed out, and
 
1/64 in. oversize hi-locks were installed.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
The mislocated parts were relocated, 
and all extraneous holes were plugged. 
Rework acceptable to Engineering for 
use. 
The defective lockbolts were removed. 
The holes were reamed out and lock­
bolts 1/64 in. oversize were installed.
 
Defective areas were blended out to a
 
10:1 ratio. Rework was acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
The porosity was ground down to No. 1
 
porosity. The remaining porosity and
 
void acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
TABLE II, (Continued)
 
Section 5. Common Bulkhead Assembly, IA39309-501
 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A126961 X-ray 65-B30, ACS, of the aft ring assembly 
3-6-65 showed a crack in the standing leg of seam 1, 
view A. 
A126968 	 X-ray 65-B41 of the aft ring weld showed at 

3-15-65 	 seam: 
1, view A - void, connected porosity, and an 
inclusion. 
2, view A - voids. 
3, views A and B - void and scattered porosity 
and void, respectively. 

A136902 X-ray 65-B41, ACS, of the forward ring assembly 

3-21-65 showed: 

a. A crack extending from the forward edge 

of the standing leg to 3/8 in. aft of the 

"Y" section radius, seam 1.
 
b. A 1/2 in. crack in the standing leg of
 
seam 3, 1/4 in. aft of the forward edge.
 
A136903 X-ray 65-B45 BM of the aft ring assembly 

3-23-65 showed lack of fusion in the aft leg of seam 

2, view B. 

A136916 X-ray 65-B45 AM of the aft ring assembly 

4-7-65 showed: 

DISPOSITION
 
The crack was ground out, rewelded,
 
and determined by X-ray to be
 
acceptable for use.
 
Seams 2 and 3, views A and B, respect­
ively, were acceptable to Engineering.
 
Seams 1 and 3, views A and A, respect­
ively, and seams 1 and 3, views A and
 
A, respectively, were ground out, re­
X-rayed and resubmitted to Engineering.
 
Seams 1 and 3, views A and A, respec­
tively were rewelded, re-X-rayed, and
 
resubmitted to Engineering. Rework
 
acceptable to Engineering.
 
The defects were ground out and re­
welded three times, and the areas
 
were subsequently reworked per SEO
 
1A39309-007, 	which was acceptable
 
to Engineering.
 
The defect was ground out and rewelded
 
twice, and the area was then accepted
 
for use.
 
a. The defect was ground out and re­
welded, and found acceptable for
 
use.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued) 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A136916 a. Crack in view 1B, seam 1. 
(Cont.) 
b. 	Cracks and inclusion in view 1B, seam 2. 
A136918 X-ray 65-B41 ACS of the forward ring assembly 
4-8-65 showed cracks in seam 1A. 
A136938 Dye check of the forward ring assembly 

5-3-65 showed cracks in seam 3, view B-B, in the 

inside diameter of the standing leg. 

A136939 X-ray 65-B60 and dye checks of the aft face 
5-4-65 meridian welds indicated: 
a. 	 Seam 1 had cracks, voids voids with tail, 
porosities, connected porosities, clusters 

of porosity, and inclusions (linear and 

transverse). 

b. 	Seam 2 had cracks, voids, voids with tails, 

porosities, connected porosities, clusters
 
of porosity, cold lap, inclusions, and 

linear inclusions, 

c. 	Seam 3 had void, void with tails, porosities, 
connected porosities, clusters of porosity, 

inclusion, and linear inclusions. 

DISPOSITION 
b. 	The crack remained after one reweld
 
operation, consequently, the area
 
had to be rewelded three times. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
The 	cracks were ground out and rewelded, 
and were found to have been removed per
 
X-ray 65-B41 ACS Rl.
 
The indications were ground out and,
 
after re-dye check, were accepted for
 
use.
 
a. 	 Seam 1 rewelded 3 times, contour 
became canned after several attempts
 
to grind out and blend defects.
 
Segment I remove and replaced. Re­
quired one reweld, was then accep­
table to Engineering.
 
b. 	Seam 2 rewelded ten times, contour
 
became canned and defects still
 
existed. Removed and replaced
 
segment 2, it then required one re­
weld before being acceptable to
 
Engineering.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued) 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 	 DISPOSITION 
A136939 d. Seam 4 had voids with tail, connected c. Seam 3 rewelded three times before 
(Cont.) porosities, and inclusions, 	 accepted by Engineering.
 
e. Seam 5 had voids with a tail, cracks, d. Seam 4 was rewelded one time and
 
transverse cracks, inclusions, dense was then acceptable to Engineering.
 
foreign material, underfill, and clusters
 
of porosity. e. Seam 5 rewelded two times, contour
 
became canned after several attempts
 
f. 	Seam 6 had void with a tail, connected to grind out defects. Segment was
 
porosities, inclusions, clusters of recontoured, defects were ground out
 
porosity, voids, underfills, and under- and were then acceptable to
 
fills with inclusions. Engineering.
 
g. 	Seam 7 had inclusions, voids with a tail, f. Seam 6 rewelded two times, contour
 
connected porosities, clusters of became canned. Recontoured canned
 
porosities, and incomplete fusion along area, and ground out and blended
 
edge. 	 existing defects, then acceptable
 
to Engineering.
 
h. 	Seam 8 had voids, voids with a tail,
 
connected porosities, linear porosities, g. Seam 7 rewelded four times. Defects
 
inclusions, linear inclusions, cracks, were ground out and blended to 10:1
 
and clusters of porosity, ratio, then accepted by Engineering.
 
i. 	Seam 9 had voids, voids with a tail, h. Seam 8 rewelded three times. Contour
 
porosities, connected porosities, inclusions, 	 became canned. Recontoured, but
 
cold laps, clusters of porosity, and trans-	 unable to remove defects. Removed
 
verse indication of inclusion, 	 and replaced segment 9. Required
 
one 	reweld then acceptable to
J. All seams showed evidence of grindout and Engineering.
 
scratches from scraper.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A136939 

(Cont.) 

A136977 X-ray 65-B72 and dye check of the forward 

6-14-65 face showed: 

a. 	Dye check indications were intermittent 

throughout entire length of all merid-

ian welds (inside and outside). 

b. 	X-ray indicated intermittent inclusions, 

linear indications, cold laps, under-

fill, connected porosity, voids, voids
 
with a tail, scratches in parent material,
 
and mechanic damage at edge of welds.
 
A136993 X-ray and.dye check of the aft ring to aft 

6-2T-65 face weld revealed: 

a. 	Connected porosity and oversize grind- 

outs between seams 1 and 2. 

b. 	Oversize grindouts between seams 2 and 3, 
and 3 and 4, several locations. 
DISPOSITION
 
i. 	Seam 9 rewelded five times. Contour
 
became canned. Recontoured but
 
defects remained. Removed and re­
placed segment 1. Ground out
 
defects of replacement weld; then
 
acceptable to Engineering.
 
J. 	Smoothed and blended all grind out
 
and scraper marks. Smoothing and
 
blending acceptable to Engineering.
 
a and b. Seams 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9 
required two rewelds and grindouts
 
before acceptance by Engineering.
 
Seams 5 and 6 required three re­
welds before acceptance by Engineer­
ing. Seam 3 required one reweld
 
before acceptance by Engineering.
 
Seam 1 required four rewelds before
 
acceptance by Engineering.
 
All defects were ground to a 10:1 ratio,
 
etched, dye checked, and polished. Dye

check revealed several No. 2 and 3
 
porosities which were ground out accep­
tably.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 	 DISPOSITION
 
A136993 c. Linear porosity and excessive grindouts
 
(Cont.) between seams 4 and 5.
 
d. 	Excess grindouts between seams 5 and 6,
 
and 6 and 7.
 
e. 	Excess grindouts and connected porosity
 
between seams 7 and 8, and 8 and 9.
 
A136999 The following defects were noted in the forward All No. 2 and 3 porosities were ground 
7-8-65 face to ring weld: out, as were cracks and check conditions. 
The 	void was acceptable, and the
 
a. 	Seam 1 to seam 2 - No. 1 porosity at mechanical damage was blended out. 
61 1/4 in., No. 2 porosity at 16 in. Defects between seams 6 and 7 were re­
welded, as were remaining defects
 
b. 	Seam 3 to seam 4 - No. 2 and 3 porosities, between seams 1 and 2, and 8 and 9. The
 
several locations. rework was acceptable.
 
c. 	Seam 5 to seam 6 - check conditions,
 
void with a tail, and No. 2, No. 3, and
 
scattered porosities.
 
d. 	Seam 6 to seam 7 - check condition,
 
several locations.
 
e. 	Seam 7 to seam 8 - linear porosity. 
f. 	Seam 8 to seam 9 - check condition, linear,
 
No. 1, and No. 2 porosity and cracks.
 
g. 	Seam 9 to seam 1 - No. 1 porosity and
 
mechanical damage to segment adjacent to
 
weld.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A142932 
6-16-65 
Aft face segments, P/N 1A39288-501, 
S/N's 00154, 00155, and 00158 were removed 
from the aft face assembly per FARR A136939. 
A142939 
6-25-65 
There was a 1/4 in. sharp depression in 
segment 3 of the forward face, 14 in. from 
the aft net trim and 16 in. from seam 3. 
A142947 
7-4-65 
There were can 
common face as 
conditions 
follows: 
in the forward 
a. Seam 5, 34 1/2 in. to 42 1/2 in. and 
45 in. to 52 in. from the forward end 
of the face. 
b. Seam 1, 62 in. to 68 in. 
forward end. 
from the 
c. Seam 4, 
forward 
23 in. 
end. 
to 31 in. from the 
A142948 
7-6-65 
37 1/2 in. from ring seam 3 toward ring 
seam 1, there was a V-shaped notch, 1/4 in 
wide x 1/8 in. deep, across the inboard 
side of the left lug. 
A142949 
7-6-65 
More than ninety-six hours elapsed between 
the end of cleaning ring, P/N 1A39280-11 
and the start of welding. 
DISPOSITION
 
The three segments were scrapped.
 
The depression showed no indication
 
when dye checked. The area was then 
smoothed out and touched up with alodine 
on the outside. The rework was accept­
able. 
The areas were reformed per B/P using 
electromagnetic forming per DPS 12070. 
Dye check of adjacent weld revealed
 
No. 3 porosity in seam 4, which was
 
ground out, blended, and accepted. 
The ear of the lug was chamfered. Dye 
check showed the defect to have been 
removed.
 
Critical surfaces were wire brushed
 
ninety-one hours after cleaning, there­
fore, the condition was accepted for use.
 
00 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 
A146950 

9-26-65 

A155224 
7-22-65 
A155315 

7-29-65 

A155316 

7-30-65 
A155320 
8-5-65 

A155321 

8-9-65 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
Visual inspection of the forward face meridians 

showed: 

a. 	Numerous small spots of discoloration on 

inside welds. 

b. 	Numerous scratches on inside and outside 

area of segments near welds.
 
There was an underfill area in the forward 
face to center plate inner weld bead, 7/8 in. 
from seam 1 toward seem 9. 
Near weld seam 9, between stations 34.5 and 
34, the honeycomb core was sanded to 1.610 
in. in a 12 sq. in.area. Minimum thickness 
should have been 1.750 in. 
Numerous discoloration spots appeared on the 

forward face after application of primer, 
P/N 	HT-424. 

Thermocouple temperature differentials 
exceeded maximum allowable five times
 
during first cure cycle. 
Numerous areas of discoloration were noted 

throughout the concave side of the bulkhead, 

DISPOSITION
 
a. 	Discoloration acceptable to
 
Engineering.
 
b. 	Numerous scratches were blended
 
out without increasing deptht then
 
anodized before acceptance by
 
Engineering.
 
The area was smoothed, blended, and 
accepted after dye check. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
The 	areas were stripped with primer
 
thinner, cleaned with deionized water, 
and 	dried thoroughly. Slight stains
 
remaining were acceptable for use. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use. 
The areas were washed down, removing
 
all residue. Paint stripper was used
 
to remove discoloration. The rework
 
was 	 acceptable. 
TABLE II, 
FARR NO. 
A1584i16 
7-31-65 
A158675 

8-19-65 
A161953 

8-24-65 
A161959 

8-25-65 

A161965 

8-28-65 

A164826 

9-21-65 

Section 5 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
X-ray 65-B87M of aft ring seam 2 revealed 
a crack in view A, and lack of fusion in 
view B. 
There were numerous underfill areas 

throughout the seal weld. 
There were leaks in the seal weld between 
seams 1 and 2, and seams 3 and 1, in six 
locations, 
There was a ding, 1/4 in. x 3/4 in. 
x 0.018 in. in the aft face of the bulk-
head, 13 3/4 in. from seam 3 and 68 in. for-
ward of the ring weld. 
There were out-of-contour conditions at 

820 latitude and 00 to 400 longitude, two
 
places. The +0.011 -0.239 in. tolerance
 
was exceeded to -0.248 in., per QEC 657B.
 
X-ray 65BllO and dye check of the aft face 

showed: 

a. 	Dye check indications varied on meridian 
welds from 0.005 in. to 0.068 in., with 
No. 2 and 3 porosity. 
b. 	X-ray indicated void, void with a tail, 

connected porosity, and linear indica-

tion in varing degrees on the meridian
 
welds.
 
DISPOSITION 
The defects were ground out, rewelded, 
re-X-rayed, and found acceptable. 
The 	areas were ground, and a third
 
weld pass was made around the entire 
circumference. The rework was accep­
table.
 
The 	areas were ground out and rewelded.
 
Subsequent leak checks revealed that 
all 	leaks had been removed.
 
The area was etched, dye checked, ard 
growler checked. No indications were 
present, and the ding was accepted 
for use. 
Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
a. 	Seams 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9 required 
grind out and blending to 10:1 ratio 
to remove defects before acceptance 
by Engineering. 
b. 	Seams 5, 6, and 7 required one re­
weld with grind out and blend to a 
10:1 ratio to remove defects before
 
acceptance by Engineering.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
PARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A164828 X-ray 65-Bl13 and dye check of the forward 

9-24-65 ring showed: 

a. Crack in seam 1, view a. 
b. Crack in standing leg.
 
A164829 Dye check of the forward face indicated 

9-23-65 No. 2 porosity in all meridian welds with 
grindout conditions. 

A164843 Dye check showed, after bond, No. 3 porosity 
9-29-65 on inboard face of aft ring seam 1. 
A164844 Dye check of the forward ring showed 
9-29-65 cracks on forward edge of base leg and 
standing leg, at seam 3. 

A166895 
10-10-65 
a. The forward common face had 
splattered spots and runs of DPM 1571 
(pasa-jell) on exterior surface, 
b. Surface scratches existed on forward 
anodic surface of assembly (maximum 
depth 0.001 in.) 
DISPOSITION 
a and b. The areas were rewelded two
 
times, ground out, re-X-rayed,
 
resubmitted, and acceptable to 
Engineering. 
Grindout conditions were blended to
 
10:1 ratio. Blended grindout and 
No. 2 porosity were acceptable to 
Engineering. 
The area was ground out three times, 
and blended to 10:1 ratio. The 
rework was acceptable following
 
re-dye check.
 
Cracks were ground out, rewelded, X-rayed, 
and resubmitted before acceptance by 
Engineering.
 
The affected surfaces were touched up
 
with alodine. The rework was accep­
table.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued) 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A166904 Forward face seams 1, 2 3, and 4 did not 
9-28-65 comply with DPS 10.320-4. No record of 
welding parameters (volts, amperes, travel 
speed and wire feed), was kept. Seam 4
 
recorded volts only. 
A166906 	 Visual inspection showed a scratch, 24 in. 

9-28-65 	 long by 0.002 in. deep in inner surface of 
segment 5, aft face. 
A169389 Welding of the aft ring stopped at a point 
10-15-65 25 in. from seam 8 toward seam 9. 
A169433 	 Inspection of the aft face revealed,that a 
11-14-65 	 3 1/2 in. by 3 in. area of segment 5 honey-

comb was below B/P tolerance. Thickness of 

honeycomb was 0.135 in. Should be 0.144 in.
 
minimum.
 
A169434 	 a. Etch solution (DPM 961) leaked through 

11-5-65 	 masking material several places on for-
ward face, removing anodic finish adja- 
cent to meridian weld areas at seams 
I through 9. 
b. 	Etch solution (DpM 961) leaked through 

masking material 	onto inside periphery 
of the forward face ring, causing dis­
coloration.
 
DISPOSITION 
Meridian seams were accepted by
 
Engineering on FARR A164829.
 
The 	scratch was touched up with alodine.
 
The 	 rework was acceptable. 
Weld was chipped out 2 in. back from 
point of termination. Then weld was 
continued to end of seam. The rework 
was 	acceptable.
 
Defect did not impair use of segment; 
therefore, segment was acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
a. 	Areas were touched up with alodine
 
per DPS 9.45, where anodic had been
 
removed.
 
b. 	Discoloration spots were sanded
 
lightly to remove discoloration.
 
Rework acceptable to Engineering
 
for 	use. 
N3 
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FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A169435 An inspection made at the request of Production, 

11-5-65 revealed that the palino block pre-dimensional 

check was made at position 2. However, the 
final bond installation was position 1, result-
ing in excessive wrinkles in the dollar plate
and in areas of segments 3, 4, 8, and 9. 
A169436 a. During bonding operation of the bulkhead 
11-10-65 identification tag, a total loss of 
vacuum occurred at 3270F. A minimum 
vacuum of 10 	 in. Hg should be maintained 
during final 	bonding. 
b. A mismatched condition of 0.148 in. 
existed between forward and aft rings,
halfway between seams 2 and 8 on the 
forward face. Maximum mismatch per B/P 
is 0.125 in.
 
A171508 	 X-ray 65-BllO and dye check of the aft face 
10-18-65 	 meridians showed seam 3 to seam 4 had a void 
with a tail and No. 3 porosity; seam 6 to 
seam 7 was undercut in inside weld; seam 8 
to seam 9 was checked and cracked on outside
 
weld, and undercut on inside weld.
 
A171510 X-ray 65-B93 showed a void with a tail seam 
10-21-65 4 to seam 5, and a cluster of porosity seam 
5 to seam 6. 
DISPOSITION
 
The vacuum was retained and the temper­
ature was increased to 110OF for one
 
hour. The wrinkles were eliminated and 
part was accepted by Engineering for 
use. 
a and b. The loss of vacuum and mis­
match of rings did not impair the
 
use of the bulkhead; therefore, the
 
bulkhead was acceptable to Engineer­
for use. 
Seam 8 to seam 9 required one reweld. 
All seams were ground out to 10:1 ratio 
and blended. Rework acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
Seam 5 to seam 6 required one reweld.
 
Defects in seam 4 to seam 5 were ground 
out and blended to a 10:1 ratio. Rework
 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. 	 DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 

A171516 X-ray 65-BI10 of the forward face center 
10-23-65 plate showed connected porosity at 
various locations throughout entire 
s eam. 
A171567 There was No. 3 porosity in the ring to dome 

11-17-65 weld between seams 7 and 8. 

A172004 	 The environmental requirements, stated in 

10-22-65 	 DPS 14052, were not met during the reweld 

of the aft ring required per FARR A171510. 

The temperature was 880F as opposed to
 
80OF permissible.
 
A172005 	 Inspection of the center plate weld revealed 

10-22-65 	 an indentation, 1/32 in. wide by 0.003 in. 

in depth, parallel to the center line of the 

center plate 	inside weld and 3/16 in. away
 
from the center line. Indentation extended
 
60 per cent of segment circumference on the
 
side of the weld on the segment face.
 
A172014 	 Inspection of the aft face revealed an 8 in. 

10-25-65 	 x 5 in. x 0.250 in. canned condition in 

segment 8 and extending across the center
 
plate weld bead into the center plate.
 
A172016 	 Inspection of the aft face revealed out-of-

10-25-65 	 contour conditions at latitudes 820 and 90 , 

and longitudes 100 through 400 and 1600 

through 3600, respectively. Out-of-contour 

dimensions at 820 and 900 latitudes were
 
-0.517 in. (should have been -0.122 to
 
-0.322 in.) and -0.650 in. (should have
 
been +0.002 to -0.498 in.).
 
DISPOSITION
 
Defects were ground out and rewelded
 
before acceptance by Engineering for
 
use.
 
Defect was removed by grindout, smooth­
ing and blending to a 10:1 ratio.
 
Rework acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
Engineering accepted the temperature
 
differential as a permissible environ­
mental welding range.
 
The indentation did not impair the
 
segments. Acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
Canned condition acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
Although out-of7 contour conditions
 
existed, they did not impair the use of
 
part; it therefore was acceptable to
 
Engineering for use.
 
TABLE II, Section 5 (Continued)
 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 	 DISPOSITION
 
A172136 	 The seal weld did not comply with B/P IA39309, The seal weld was X-rayed, dye checked,
 
11-12-65 	 Zone 12, view D. The B/P called for two leak checked, and visually inspected.
 
5/32 in. fillet welds. Three welds were The three-pass weld was acceptable to
 
made with the third weld in the center of Engineering for use.
 
the -9 spacer.
 
A172139 	 Contour out-of-tolerance condition existed Out-of-tolerance condition did not 
11-13-65 	 at latitudes 820 and 900. Contour condition impair use of common bulkhead; there­
at 820 varied between -0.302 and -0.397 in., fore, Engineering accepted it for use. 
but it should have been -0.047 to -0.297 in. 
Contour condition at 90 was -0.4o06 in., but 
it should have been -0.069 to -0.319 in. 
A177815 Pasa-jell splatter was noted on aft face of Acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
12-8-65 common bulkhead on anodized surface.
 
TABLE II, (Continued)
 
Section 6. Aft Dome Assembly, P/N 2A39308-507 
FARE NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A169379 
10-19-65 
Inspection of segment, S/N 00155, showed a 
0.005 in. x 1/32 in. x 1 1/2 in. scratch on 
outside surface of segment, 12 in. from aft 
end rough trim and crosswise of weld pass 
at next assembly seam 3. 
A169385 
10-13-65 
Etching material had slattered on outside 
surface of segment, S/N 00156, causing 
removal of the anodic material. 
A169390 
10-16-65 
Visual inspection of segment, S/N 00156, 
revealed: 
a. Backside shrinkage on inside of L-L 
fitting, approximately 75 per cent of 
circumference, directly opposite outside 
edge of weld. Maximum depth of depression 
was 0.026 in. Width was 1/16 in. to 1/8 
in. 
b. Excess penetration bead on inside of fitting 
adjacent to depression. Maximum height 
was 0.030 in. 
A169392 
10-16-65 
Inspection of segment, S/N 00162, revealed 
underfill and no fusion at two 1/2 in. areas 
of inside fillet weld of H-H flange, 
DISPOSITION
 
Scratch did not impair use of segment.
 
Segment was acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
Areas where anodic had been removed 
were touched up per DAC spec F-289. 
The rework was acceptable. 
a and b. Excess penetration was
 
ground flush +0.005 in., dye checked 
and blended. Defect did not impair 
use of segment; therefore, segment 
was acceptable to Engineering for 
use.
 
Underfill and lack of fusion areas
 
were ground out and rewelded. The 
rework was acceptable. 
.) 
TABLE IT, Section 6 (Continued) 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS DISPOSITION 
A169394 
10-19-65 
Inspection of segment, S/N 00185, revealed 
the AC-AC fitting outside weld had 3/32 in. 
x 3/16 in. x 0.020 in. depression in crown 
of tie-off area. 
Defect did not impair use of segment; 
therefore, segment was acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
A171506 
10-12-65 
X-ray 65-B122, view 2, of segment, S/N 00152, 
showed a void with a tail, lack of fusion, 
and porosity in the outside weld. 
Outside weld rewelded two times before 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
A171518 
10-25-65 
Dye check of segment, S/N 00158, showed crack 
in inside weld at view 5, GG fitting, and 
No. 1 porosity after grindout to remove crack, 
Defect was ground out, smoothed, and 
blended to a 10:1 ratio. Smooth and 
blend acceptable to Engineering for 
use. 
A171552 
11-9-65 
X-ray 65-B222 and dye check of aft dome 
meridians showed: 
a. Lack of fusion at the edge of penetration, 
segment 3 side of weld seem 3. 
b. Linear porosity transverse to weld seam 8. 
a. 
b. 
Meridian seam 3 was ground out, 
smoothed, and blended until defect 
was removed before acceptance by 
Engineering for use. 
Meridian seam 8 was ground out, 
smoothed, and blended until defect 
removed before acceptance by 
Engineering for use. 
A171580 
11-24-65 
X-ray 65-B122 of the aft dome meridians 
showed: 
a. At the junction of seams 1 and 2, a 
9/16 in. in length extending across 
1 from the jamb weld. 
crack 
seam 
a, b, and c. Segments with defective 
welds were cut out and tests were 
made to determine cause of cracks. 
New segments were welded into the 
dome. The rework was acceptable. 
TABLE II, 
FARE NO. 
A171580 

(Cont.) 

A171582 
11-30-65 
A171596 
12-7-65 

A171598 
12-8-65 

A171978 
10-29-65 
A171986 
11-2-65 
A172008 

10-22-65 
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Section 6 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
b. 	At the junction of seams 2 and 3, a crack 
3/8 in. in length, transverse to jamb weld, 
extending across seam 2 from jamb weld. 
c. At the junction of seams 7 and 8, a crack
 
5/16 in. in length, transverse to jamb weld, 
extending across seam 7 from jamb weld. 
Dye check of fitting, S/N 00171, outside weld 
showed connected porosity between views 1 and 
2. 

X-ray 65-B149 of segment 8 showed voids in 
weld at view AB-AB. 
Dye check of segment 3 to B-B fitting 
inside weld showed a crater crack at view 4. 
Inspection of segment, S/N 00155, revealed 
numerous etch splatters on outer surface, 
which removed anodic finish, 
The 	thickness of the segment at seam 7 weld 
pad area was below B/P requirement of 0.191 
.t 0.005 in. Segment thickness in the noted 
area varied from 0.182 in. to 0.185 in. 
Scratches were found in anodized surface of 

weld pad, and adjacent to the waffle pattern 

near the AB-AB fitting. 
DISPOSITION
 
Defects were ground out and blended. 
Grindout and blend acceptable to 
Engineering.
 
Voids were not serious enough to cause 
rework. Weld is acceptable to 
Engineering for use. 
Defect was ground out and blended. 
Rework acceptable to Engineering for
 
use.
 
Splatter marks were touched up with 
zinc chromate primer. Rework 
acceptable to Engineering for use. 
Out-of-tolerance thickness of segment 
acceptable to Engineering. 
Scratched areas were touched up with
 
alodine per DPS 9.45. The rework
 
was 	acceptable. 
N, 
0o 
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FARR NO. 
A177835 

12-16-65 
A177841 
12-19-65 

A177850 
12-22-65 
A177874 

1-3-66 

A177887 
1-7-66 

A177889 

1-7-66 

DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
Inspection of segment 6 revealed that the 

outside fillet weld of the H-H wire leadout 
port flange fitting was undersize. Weld 
should have been 3/16 in. by 3/16 in; 
however, it was 1/8 in. by 5/32 in. 
The 	 thickness of segment 2 at both meridian 
seams was under the B/P tolerance, 

Inspection of the meridian welds revealed 
that: 
a. Seams 5, 6, and 8 had grindout condi­
tions to depth of -0.026 in. 
b. Seam 7 was mismatched by 0.030 in. 
at the trim line. 
The ovality of the flange, P/N 1A39308-441, 

exceeded B/P tolerances, 

X-ray 66-B122 and dye check revealed lack of 
fusion at faying edge, dense inclusion, and 

cracks inside seam 3. 
X-ray 66-BI22A and dye check revealed lack of 
fusion at S-S elbow to tube faying edge, and 
cracks inside seam 3. 
DISPOSITION 
Defect did not impair the effectiveness
 
of the H-H wire leadout port flange 
fitting; therefore, it was acceptable
 
to Engineering for use.
 
Under tolerance condition of segment 2 
acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
a. 	 Grindouts were smoothed and blended 
to a 10:1 ratio. Rework acceptable 
to Engineering for use. 
b. 	Mismatch acceptable to Engineering
 
for use.
 
Excessive ovality of flange acceptable
 
to Engineering for use.
 
Inclusions acceptable to Engineering. 
Lack of fusion and cracks in weld were
 
ground out and rewelded. Two rewelds
 
were required before acceptance by
 
Engineering for use. 
Defects were ground out and blended.
 
Rework was acceptable to Engineering 
for 	use.
 
TABLE II, 

FARR NO 
A177892 

1-7-66 
A177893 

1-7-66 

A182601 
1-5-66 

A182612 

1-11-66 

Section 6 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
X-ray 66-B122A revealed scattered porosity 

in the forward side weld of the W-W bracket, 
Dye check revealed cracks and No. 3 porosity 
inside seam 3 and cracks on the outside of 
weld seam 3. 
On the aft dome, one stud, located near seam 
8 on segment 8, was broken off at 25 in. ­
lbs. torque, 
Fitting contour check of the aft dome 

revealed out-of-tolerance conditions at: 

a. latitudes 17 1/20, 300, 500, and 600.
 
b. R-R LOX chill return fitting.
 
c. B-B LOX fill line. 
d. AK-AK LOX pressure sensor fitting.
 
e. G-G LH2 feed line fitting.
 
DISPOSITION 
The porosity in the weld was not serious
 
enough to warrant rework; therefore,
Engineering accepted the weld for use. 
Defects were grourd out, and the grind­
out was blended to a 10:1 ratio. Rework
 
was acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
Old weld material was removed with spot 
face. A new stud was installed in
 
accordance with DPS 14170. The rework
 
was acceptable.
 
a through e. Out-of-tolerance conditions
 
acceptable to Engineering for use.
 
TABLE II, 
FARR NO. 
A197922 
5-12-66 
A198154 

5-i8-66 

(Continued)
 
Section 7. Forward Skirt Assembly, 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
On stringers 99, 101, and 103, 4.5 in. forward 
of the aft interface, there were bar marks, 
At stringers 4, 10, 28, 34, 40, 44, 52, 58, 

64, 70, 76, 82, 88, 94, 100, and 105, station 

676.702, AD5 rivets through intercostal,
 
P/N 1B29835-43, and the forward interface
 
were gapped 0.002 in. to 0.005 in.
 
P/N 1B29835-503 
DISPOSITION 
All sharp defects were blended and 
polished. A doubler was fabricated
 
and installed per Engineering instrue­
tions. The rework was acceptable.
 
A shim was installed to fill the gaps.
 
The rework was acceptable.
 
TABLE II, (Continued)
 
Section 8. Aft Skirt Assembly, P/N 1B29825-507 
FARR NO. DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
A197914 
5-6-66 
Between stringers 98 and 101, station 220, 
there were two excess attachments through 
angle, P/N 1A79478-49, causing a short edge 
distance for one hole at each end. 
A198174 
6-2-66 
At stringers 80 and 81, station 200, eight 
holes for jo bolts, P/N NAS 1669-3KS, were 
double drilled through support, P/N 1B32637-3, 
angles, P/N's 1B29827-5 and lB64562-505, 
and strap, P/N 1B64561-507. 
A2O3409 
6-24-66 
At stringer 98, station 200, one 0.2465/ 
0.2485 in. hole for a hilok bolt, P/N HL20-8, 
was elongated to 0.273 in. through angle, 
P/N 1A79478-49, and segment, P/N 1B58554-1. 
DISPOSITION 
One extra B/P attachment was installed 
evenly spaced between the second and
 
third attachments. Otherwise, the 
condition was accepted by Engineering
 
for use. 
The support, angles, and straps were
 
removed and replaced by new parts
 
which were fabricated and installed
 
per Engineering instructions. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
The hole was enlarged to 0.308/0.310
 
in. for installation of hilok bolt, P/N
 
HL20-10, and collar, P/N HL72-10. The
 
rework was acceptable.
 
TABLE II, 
FARR NO. 
A197904 
4-29-66 

A197917 

5-10-66 

A198152 

5-17-66 

A209897 
4-26-66 

(Continued)
 
Section 9. Thrust Structure Assembly, 
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECTS 
One 3/16 in. hole was drilled in the stayout 
area of stringer 18, the flange of frame, 
P/N IA68381-l, and the skin. 
a. There were sixty-five 5/32 in. holes 
misdrilled at stringers 9 and 10. 
b. One BB5 rivet was installed by mistake 
in each of stringers 9 and 10. 
On brackets, P/N's IB38493-3, -5, and -9, 
the 1 3/4 in., 1 1/2 in., and 1 9/16 in. 
dimensions, respectively, were out 'of ' 
tolerance. 
On frame assembly, P/N IA68381-1, the -15 
strap was mislocated 3/4 in. counterclock-

rode the strap.the -23 framewise, and 
P/N IA39316-507 
DISPOSITION 
The hole was plugged double flush with 
AD rivet material. A hole was drilled 
to install the B/P attachment. The 
rework was acceptable.
 
a and b. After plugging several mis­
located holes, both stringers were
 
removed and replaced per B/P. The 
rework was acceptable.
 
A shim was fabricated and installed 
per Engineering instructions to fill 
the gaps. The rework was acceptable. 
The strap was removed and replaced per 
B/P. The rework was acceptable.
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
 
ABCL As Built Configuration List. A listing of the part number, 
change letter, and manufacturing position index number. Compiled 
by the Reliability Assurance Department from the manufacturing 
paper applicable to the stage. 
ACS Automatic Checkout System (Complete Complex) 
AFQA Air Force Quality Assurance
 
AGC Automatic Gain Control
 
AO 	 Assembly Outline. Document controlling the assignment of work 
to assembly areas, and provides a record of conformance. 
Planned and released by Manufacturing Planning and verified 
through Reliability Assurance (Quality Control) procedures. 
APS 	 Auxiliary Propulsion System 
CCO 	 Contract Change Order 
COAL 	 A computer routine for changing data in memory.
 
Countdown 	Tasks carried on during the backward counting (in minutes and 
seconds) from initiation to conclusion of a propellant loading,
 
or static firing exercise. 
Critical Those functional components essential to stage performance. 
Compon­
ents
 
DDAS Digital Data Acquisition System
 
Dye Check Dye penetrant Inspection. Visual identification of surface
 
weld defects, such as porosity and cracks, with a colored dye.
 
EBT Exploding Bridge Wire System
 
ECL 	 Engineering Configuration List. A tabulated listing of the 
Douglas/vendor part numbers, Douglas/government/industry
 
standard part numbers, specification and source control drawing
 
numbers, processes and material specification numbers, test
 
requirement drawing numbers, bulk material identification
 
numbers, serialized engineering order and drawing change request
 
engineering order numbers, plus the part number and drawing
 
change letters defining the engineering released design intent
 
applicable to this end item.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued)
 
Engineering Change Proposal 
A customer-required system, or any principal system or subsystem 
elements. Also, those articles covered by major subcontracts,
 
delivered direct to a customer, or provided as customer furnished 
property to a contractor.
 
Engineering Order. Engineering document which is used to release
 
design intent, for development and manufacture. 
Frequency Modulated radio transmission.
 
Failure and Rejection Report. A report used to identify or 
divert nonconforming material. Also used to record dispositions 
of such material, and the corrective action taken to prevent 
recurrence.
 
First Article Configuration Inspection
 
A material inspection and receiving report used to transfer an 
end item from one location or responsible agency to another.
 
Historical record used to document scope change verification.
 
Florida Test Center. Douglas Missile and Space Systems Division
 
test center at Cape Kennedy, Florida.
 
A sonic inspection method for detecting internal discontinuities
 
in Saturn stage common bulkheads.
 
Ground Support Equipment. Equipment whose function is to
 
transport, protect, handle, service, test, check out, and
 
monitor the complete Saturn S-IVB stage, separate assemblies, or 
components.
 
Handling and checkout drawings (test procedure)
 
Helium
 
Inspection Item Sheet
 
Instrument Unit 
Kennedy Space Center, located in Florida. 
Liquid Hydrogen 
Liquid Oxygen 
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Log Book A compilation of special records, packaged in book form, 
pertaining to a given end item. 
MRB Material Review Board. A committee which evaluates and determines 
the disposition of all rejected material (other than obvious 
scrap or incompletes) and initiates corrective action to prevent 
recurrence of the nonconformances leading to the rejections. 
NPC 200-2 NASA Quality Publication. The Quality Program Provisions for 
Space Systems Contractors. 
OLSTOL On Line Saturn Test Oriented Language. A method of manual 
(i.e. typewriter) input to correct a computer program. 
PAM Pulse Amplitude Modulated radio transmission 
PCM Pulse Code Modulated radio transmission 
PCL Planning Configuration List. Tabulated listing prepared by the 
planning release group containing that information listed on the 
engineering configuration list plus information required by the 
planning and manufacturing departments. 
Permanent A condition, signifying material is nonconforming at the time of 
Nonconfor- inspection, and cannot be made to conform exactly. 
mane e 
Permeabil- Degree to which one substance will diffuse through or penetrate 
ity another. 
Porosity Gas pockets or voids free of solid material occuring in welds. 
PDM Pulse Duration Modulation of radio transmission. 
P/N Part number 
PMR Programmed Mixture Ratio 
ppm Parts per million 
PU Propellant Utilization system 
PUEA Propellant Utilization Electronic Assembly 
psia Pounds per square inch, absolute. Pressure measurement which 
includes atmospheric pressure. 
psig Pounds per square inch, gauge. Pressure measurement which does 
not include atmospheric pressure. 
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QEC 	 Quality Engineering Chart. A chart, prepared by Quality 
Engineering, which provides specific inspection instructions to 
shop personnel, and a means of recording sequential inspection
 
for each unit fabricated.
 
RACS 	 Remote Automatic Calibration System (telemetry checkout). 
RF 	 Radio Frequency
 
RMR Reference Mixture Ratio 
RM Revolutions per minute 
RS 	 Range Safety
 
RSRS Range Safety receiver system
 
SC Scope Change. Changes, requirements, or details on all or any
 
part of a program. 
scam Rate of flow measurement - standard cubic centimeters per minute. 
scim Rate of flow measurement - standard cubic inches per minute. 
SC0 	 Subcarrier Oscillator
 
SE0 	 Serial Engineering Order. Engineering order, generally used to
 
authorize and describe rework in conjunction with a production
 
change. The SE0 is also used to issue information or work 
authorization when no drawing change is involved, i.e., salvages
 
for manufacturing errors, and authorization for variation from
 
engineering drawing requirements or information. 
SIM Safety Item Monitor 
SPCR Saturn Program Change Request 
SSC Space Systems Center. Douglas Missile and Space System Division 
Center at Huntington Beach, California. 
STC Sacramento Test Center, located at Sacramento, California 
S/N 	 Serial number
 
TACD 	 Test Area Control Document 
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TCC Test Control Center 
TCS Thermoconditioning System 
TD Technical Directive 
Time/Cycle A component or end item, the measured life of which is important 
Signifi- enough to justify running time, cycle, or attribute data collection. 
cant Item 
T/M Telemetry 
TR Test Request 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
Ullage The pressure of the gases in the unfilled portion of the 
Pressure propellant tanks. 
Ultrasonic An inspection method employing ultrasonic waves to detect 
Inspection discontinuities in internal insulation bonding. 
Umbilical Stage/GSE interface point for stage servicing and monitoring 
from a ground source. 
VCL Vehicle Checkout Laboratory, located at SSC and STC 
VCO Voltage Controlled Oscillator 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VSWR Voltage Standing Wave Ratio. A measure of antenna efficiency. 
WRO Work Release Order. Document providing authority for the 
accomplishment of work within the Douglas Missile and Space 
Systems Division. 
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